



## EU surveying the EU – the Future of Europe

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*In a follow-up to our article on the Lisbon Treaty in ESR no. 37, this summary from EU-27 Watch of the EU-CONSENT project<sup>1</sup> discusses surveyed opinions of EU member states on ratification of the Treaty, as well as the status of Kosovo and security challenges from European Neighbourhood (ENP) regions. It concludes with a snapshot of current debates in the member states over the future of Europe and national EU strategies.*

### Future of Europe: Few stumbling blocks – little debate

The convoy of 27 member states shall reach its destination to ratify the Lisbon Treaty by 31 December 2008 without being derailed. EU governments are currently occupied with managing carefully the ratification processes at home. The ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, signed on 13 December 2007, started immediately in the last days of the Portuguese Presidency. The Hungarian parliament was the first to ratify the Lisbon Treaty as early as 17 December 2007.<sup>2</sup>

The current state of play shows that 26 member states, i.e. all but Ireland, decided to ratify the Treaty in a parliamentary procedure. In some cases the assent of two<sup>3</sup> or more chambers<sup>4</sup> is necessary. In the four countries, that had held referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, i.e. in Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands and France, it was decided not to repeat this exercise. It was uncontroversial in Luxembourg and Spain, where the citizens had voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, that this time a parliamentary procedure would do. In France, the newly elected President Sarkozy and a new government under Prime Minister Fillon were determined to oppose any calls for a second referendum. In the Netherlands, the new cabinet Balkenende IV (with the help of the Labour faction), found a way around “two seemingly contradictory objectives. First: to avoid the prospect of a second referendum. Second: the need to address the gap between politics and the electorate as regards the EU, which had emerged after the 2005 referendum”.<sup>5</sup> Ratification is now expected in the autumn after a parliamentary debate in summer.

Clarification was also needed in the United Kingdom, where the Conservative party, as opposition in the House of Commons, challenged the government to go for a referendum. At the beginning of March during the marathon debate on the Lisbon Treaty in the House of Commons it became definitive that no referendum will be held, despite the ongoing clamour from the Conservative party<sup>6</sup> and much of the national media.<sup>7</sup> The government under the new Prime

<sup>1</sup> The EU-27 Watch project is a part of EU-CONSENT, a network of excellence for joint research and teaching comprising more than 50 research institutes that address questions for the mutual reinforcing effects of the deepening and widening of the EU. EU-CONSENT is supported by the EU's 6th Framework Programme. The EU 27 Watch project sheds light through surveys on key issues and challenges of European integration. Institutes from all 27 EU member states as well as from Croatia and Turkey participate in this survey. The aim is to give a full comparative picture of debates on European integration and current developments in European politics in each of these countries. ISIS Europe is assisting EU-CONSENT to disseminate project results into the EU.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hungarian chapter on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. e.g. the Austrian, Czech, Dutch, German, and Polish chapters on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>4</sup> For example in Belgium.

<sup>5</sup> Dutch chapter on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>6</sup> On 6 March 2008, the MPs in the House of Commons rejected a proposal to hold a UK-wide referendum on the Lisbon Treaty by 311 votes to 248.

Minister Brown fought for an interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty that fell short of a “fundamental constitutional change”<sup>8</sup>. Also in Denmark and Portugal, where referenda on the Constitutional Treaty had initially been considered but scrapped or postponed after the Dutch and French no votes, the case was effectively made for a parliamentary procedure being sufficient. In Portugal, the special role of holding the Presidency during the final negotiations on the reform Treaty and the name of the new Treaty after the place of its solemn signature, raised the pressure for a smooth ratification. But only in January 2008, Socialist Prime Minister Socrates (supported by the centre-right PSD) announced that no referendum would be held, which was not uncontroversial. In Denmark, the Ministry of Justice concluded that the Lisbon Treaty will not relinquish national sovereignty to the EU, so that a referendum would not be needed. This leaves Ireland where a referendum is obligatory and binding for the government. It will probably be carried through at the end of May. With the exception of Sinn Fein, no party in the Irish parliament is against the Lisbon Treaty. However, given the experience of a failed referendum on the Nice Treaty and noting that large portions of the Irish voters are still undecided, it cannot be taken for granted that the yes vote will succeed.

Other obstacles on the way towards ratification are in countries like the Czech Republic and Germany. In the latter, the Constitutional Court will have to decide on complaints that are expected to be filed by EU-sceptic deputies; in the Czech Republic, EU-critics from the ruling ODS intend to use the Czech Constitutional Court to stop or delay ratification. While in Germany a referendum can be ruled out, in the Czech Republic, a referendum might be considered, in case the Court concludes that the Lisbon Treaty conflicts with the Czech constitution. Obstacles like these might slow down the process and endanger the time table that foresees the effective entry into force of the Treaty on 1 January 2009. But it is very unlikely that they will lead to a failure of the second attempt to ratify a Treaty signed by the 27 governments.

According to the specific calendars for the ratification process that are envisaged by member states, ratification can be expected to be complete by December 2008. Up to mid-March, six member states had already completed ratification, i.e. Hungary (December 2007), Slovenia (January 2008), Malta (January 2008), France (February 2008), Romania (February 2008), and Bulgaria (March 2008). Facing a referendum, the Irish government and supporting parties as well as the National Forum on Europe (government funded independent agency) started extensive publicity campaigns on the Lisbon Treaty. In most other member states, the new Treaty and the ensuing ratification process were not a hot issue. Only few countries, like the Netherlands, started a new communication strategy and tried to inform and involve the citizens beyond the normal information policies and measures.

Sometimes other issues of European policy were far more imminent, like the introduction of the Euro by Malta and Cyprus on 1 January 2008, the extension of the Schengen area<sup>9</sup> or the upcoming UEFA Euro 2008 in Austria. Some already started to speculate on likely nominees for the new posts created by the Lisbon Treaty, particularly the elected president of the European Council. Usual suspects mentioned in the reports of *EU-27 Watch* are Juncker and Blair. However, even the personalities to fill the new posts did not stir passionate debates. Secret diplomacy around these issues is expected as long as the ratification process is not yet won. Any (even unrelated and accidental) disturbances can trigger domino effects and cause collateral damage to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. To keep media attention down is sometimes preferred as not to wake sleeping dogs which is the case in the United Kingdom, where Prime Minister Brown even did not show up for the official signing ceremony in Lisbon. In member

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<sup>7</sup> Cf. the British chapter on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>8</sup> British chapter on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>9</sup> The following nine countries joined the Schengen area at the end of 2007: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

states where EU-sceptics on one side or disappointed integrationists on the other side could probably gain momentum and public support, governments try to present the case of the new Treaty as a technical adjustment or update of the exiting treaties<sup>10</sup>. Overall, the country reports presented in the *EU-27 Watch* show that each government has to work out a specific strategy that suits domestic circumstances.

The decision to install a Reflection Group, following the original proposal by President Sarkozy to establish a Committee of the Wise, a group of people, aimed to chart Europe's future, has gained little political and public attention so far. French media reported more detail on this initiative, including speculations on a probable hidden agenda with the aim to present arguments that will help keeping Turkey out of the EU. Similar speculations on an anti-enlargement bias were taken up also in other member states like Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Poland, and of course in Turkey<sup>11</sup>. Most governments and parties in the member states are satisfied with the low key mandate of the Reflection Group, because neither the pressing need for its establishment nor the legitimacy of a group of personalities standing outside the proper institutions and decision-making procedures in the EU-multilevel system is seen as evident<sup>12</sup>. Also the explicit exclusion of issues like institutions, budget, and an overall reopening of issues dealt with in the reform Treaty was welcomed, in particular by Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom so that it should not interfere with the current ratification processes. However, the size and envisaged composition of its members as well as the already appointed trio to chair the Group with former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez at the top are well received and deemed appropriate.

As far as the agenda of the Reflection Group is concerned, questions related to energy policy, combating terrorism, immigration, competitiveness and reform of the EU economy and also CFSP<sup>13</sup> are favoured in the capitals. It is, however, far too early to say whether the work of the Group in "horizon 2020-2030" will gain more attention and become a reference point in member states and in Brussels.

## **Enlargement and Western Balkans: Focus on Kosovo**

With regard to the Western Balkans, the recognition of independence of Kosovo was the most pressing challenge. Member states responded differently for various reasons. The EU had been united in supporting the Ahtisaari-Plan and the "Kosovo-troika" chaired by Ambassador Ischinger as EU representative<sup>14</sup>. When the best-case scenario – a negotiated solution between Belgrade and Prishtina – failed, the EU was at least united in its decision to send a European Union Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo).<sup>15</sup> Also the message to keep the door open for Serbia and send positive signals to Belgrade to further support democratic forces in its pre-accession towards the EU was widely shared in member states.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Czech chapter on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Czech, Finnish, Italian, Polish, and Turkish chapters on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Danish, Estonian, Finnish, Greek, Hungarian, and Spanish chapters on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Greek chapter on the future of the EU (question 1).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council, 14 December 2007, Presidency Conclusions, No. 16616/1/07, available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf) (last access: 25.03.2008).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. the following documents: Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council, 14 December 2007, Presidency Conclusions, No. 16616/1/07, available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf) (last access: 25.03.2008). Council Joint Action, 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, in: Official Journal of the EU, No. L42, 16.2.2008, p. 92ff., available at: [http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=1352&lang=de](http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1352&lang=de) (last access: 25.03.2008). Council of the European Union: Council Conclusion on Kosovo, 2851st External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 18 February 2008, available at: [http://www.eu2008.si/en/News\\_and\\_Documents/Council\\_Conclusions/February/0218\\_GAERC5.pdf](http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/February/0218_GAERC5.pdf) (last access: 20.03.2008).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, Finnish, French, Hungarian, and German chapters on Western Balkans and Enlargement (question 2).

The EU remained, however, split when the ‘Assembly of Kosovo’ declared the independence of Kosovo from Serbia on 17 February 2008: Four EU members, Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia are definitely not going to recognise Kosovo, mostly for fears of giving a negative example for encouraging separatist tendencies and ethnic minorities in their countries (Basques and Catalans in Spain, Turks in the “self-declared ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’” in Cyprus<sup>17</sup>, Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia) to push for secession. All 27 countries including those that have already or will recognise Kosovo at a later stage are concerned about probably opening “a Pandora’s box of secessions”<sup>18</sup> and insist that Kosovo is a unique *sui generis* case without precedence.

The first wave of recognition comprised the United Kingdom and France together with the United States of America (18 February 2008), followed by Germany and Latvia, then Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg and Poland (21-29 February 2008) as well as Sweden, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Finland (4-7 March 2008). Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia issued a joint statement on their future recognition of Kosovo. They underlined their support for the active commitment of the EU and NATO for stability and democracy building in Kosovo, and expressed their interest in developing further ties with Serbia. All three countries then officially recognized Kosovo’s independence (19-20 March 2008)<sup>19</sup>. Lithuania is also planning to recognise Kosovo, while four are as yet undecided, cautious or reluctant: the Czech Republic, Greece, Malta and Portugal. In particular the three Baltic countries but also Slovenia were disappointed that the EU could not speak with one voice in the case of recognition. However, damage was limited not in the least through agreement on the EULEX mission. There is a strong awareness that the mission in Kosovo and the coordination between EULEX, UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and KFOR (NATO Kosovo Force) is a test case for the operation ability and the capacities of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).<sup>20</sup>

The French government is particularly concerned about a distinct EU role in the region. Foreign Minister Kouchner explained “that it was the EU’s responsibility to formulate a European position, distinct from that of Russia and the US. This idea accurately summarizes the general feeling amongst French observers, who consider the Kosovo question to be a crucial challenge for ESDP. The aim is to understand whether the EU has already learned from past mistakes.”<sup>21</sup> Serbia is widely regarded as the key country to future stability on the Western Balkans.<sup>22</sup>

## **Neighbours: Looking East – looking South**

In many EU member states illegal migration (South and East ENP), energy diversification, terrorism and political instability in general (South) are identified as the biggest challenges from the ENP regions.

Under the roof of the ENP six Eastern European countries and ten countries around the Mediterranean rim are lumped together. Notwithstanding the geographic coherence of the ENP concept, member states hold clear preferences and take special interests in specific countries of the East or South. The overall balance goes towards the East. It is reported from 15 member

<sup>17</sup> Cypriot chapter on Western Balkans and Enlargement (question 2).

<sup>18</sup> Danish chapter on Western Balkans and Enlargement (question 2).

<sup>19</sup> Cf., for example, BBC News: Serbia's neighbours accept Kosovo, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7304488.stm> (last access: 25.03.2008); and BBC News: Bulgaria accepts Kosovo statehood, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7307234.stm> (last access: 25.03.2008).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. especially the Finnish chapter on Western Balkans and Enlargement (question 2), but also the Estonian, Luxembourgian, and Romanian chapters on Western Balkans and Enlargement (question 2).

<sup>21</sup> French chapter on Western Balkans and Enlargement (question 2).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Croatian, Czech, French, Hungarian, Lithuanian and Slovenian chapters on Western Balkans and Enlargement (question 2).

*EU surveying the EU – the Future of Europe*, edited by Gunilla Herolf and Giji Gya states to have a clear preference for countries in the East in the ENP context<sup>23</sup>. France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain look towards the South, while Ireland and the United Kingdom understand their position as being neutral or honest brokers, and Luxembourg, Slovenia, the Netherlands and even Cyprus claim to have a balanced interest in both directions. Also among those looking towards the East some, like Germany or Sweden, support a balanced but not a zero sum approach trading one region off against the other.

A good example for the inclusive EU oriented approach was the debate over the Mediterranean Union, proposed by Sarkozy. The initial proposal was perceived as opaque in terms of its content and dubious with regard to its intentions. The proposal was received cool and was criticised by most member states<sup>24</sup>. In particular Germany spoke against the formation of a Mediterranean Union apart from the EU structures and the Barcelona process, and without full participation of all member states. Some support for the French initiative came from Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain. Finally, a Franco-German proposal was accepted by the European Council in March 2008: It keeps the new name “Union for the Mediterranean”, but the substance changed. It is now about invigorating the Barcelona process.<sup>25</sup>

In line with geographic preferences and economic, political and societal ties, other subregional initiatives and formats of cooperation are supported, namely the Nordic dimension (Finland) and Baltic cooperation<sup>26</sup>. Currently the Black Sea Synergy<sup>27</sup> gains special attraction not in the least because of concerns of security of energy supply and transport. Even a “Black Sea Union”<sup>28</sup> is proposed. Particularly supportive is Bulgaria who regards itself as among the “principal driving forces for the development of this policy in the first half of 2007”<sup>29</sup>. Other supporters are France, Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia. Poland qualifies its support so that the Black Sea Synergy does not distract the countries from the EU membership track. The intensification of cooperation between the EU and the Black Sea countries with a view to strengthening regional cooperation is also valued as a strategic element of closer relations with the neighbouring Caspian Sea and Central Asian countries<sup>30</sup>. The new Central Asia strategy of the EU – although not part of the ENP – is appreciated as of important EU interest foremost with regard to improving the diversification of the EU’s energy links.<sup>31</sup>

Among the Eastern ENP countries, Ukraine is clearly regarded as the key country and crucial for stability and democratic development in the East. The enhanced agreement that is currently under negotiation between the EU and Ukraine is important for a new generation of Free Trade Agreements that envisage deep and comprehensive free trade. Some EU countries go beyond and champion a membership perspective of Ukraine at a certain not specified moment.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. country reports of: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Austrian, Bulgarian, Finnish, German, Hungarian, Irish, Romanian, and Turkish chapters on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council, 13/14 March 2008, Presidency Conclusions, No. 7652/08, available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/99410.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/99410.pdf) (last access: 25.03.2008).

<sup>26</sup> Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, and Sweden. Slovenia, Malta, Netherlands, and Luxembourg are not involved but supportive.

<sup>27</sup> The EU seeks to increase cooperation among and between the countries surrounding the Black Sea. As such, the EU has developed a programme, “Black Sea Synergy”, with a number of concrete initiatives looking at areas like transport, energy, the environment, maritime management, fisheries, migration, and the fight against organised crime, the information society and cultural cooperation. [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/blacksea/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm)

<sup>28</sup> Austrian chapter on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>29</sup> Bulgarian chapter on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>30</sup> Cf. the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Romanian chapters on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>31</sup> Cf., for example, the German chapter on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Finnish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Polish chapters on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

On Russia, the views are split and the focus differs. So far, obstacles to the start of negotiations on a new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement as such provoked little reflection and debate. It can be assumed that the preferred level of ambition with regard to the new agreement differs across the EU member states. For example, Estonia limits its expectations so that the “new agreement sets out realistic aims and should define the rights and obligations of both parties as clear as possible in order to minimize room for different interpretations”<sup>33</sup>. Germany is more ambitious as to the goal of “a strategic partnership” and defining sectoral mutual interests but less determined on a rigorous conditionality as part of the new agreement. Also the Finns “tend to think ‘business first’ and try to avoid actions that would irritate Russia”<sup>34</sup>. Generally, the relationship with Russia is frequently discussed in the context of energy policy. Russia is perceived as a very difficult but crucial partner<sup>35</sup>. Moscow is, however, criticised for its use of energy as a weapon to exert pressure on neighbouring countries including EU members. The “bullying tactics”<sup>36</sup> and “the Russian tendency to confront and pressurize its neighbours unilaterally”<sup>37</sup> are rejected. EU solidarity and a unified stance on Russia are claimed urgent by new and also by old members.<sup>38</sup>

In the Czech Republic, the missile weapon shield is a high salient issue. The new Polish government under Prime Minister Tusk, however, declares strong interest in improving the strained relations with Russia via EU and bilateral channels. In particular the Baltic countries warn to rush into new agreements with Russia before having found a consensus among the EU member states and a stronger commitment of Russia to play by the rules and obligations that it has subscribed to, e.g. through membership in the Council of Europe.

### **Other current issues of high salience in the member states**

There is a series of non-EU related issues that catch the attention of governments, parties, policy makers, citizens and media. Reports on coalition disputes, upcoming elections<sup>39</sup>, or recent elections with their difficult outcomes (Cyprus, Denmark) or other implications<sup>40</sup> can work as specific restrictions and factors that can also influence the EU politics of member states, and are thus of interest for the other EU partners. Of shared interest is also the OSCE presidency of Finland in 2008, or debates in Finland and Sweden on closer relations with NATO. Moreover, the reaction towards and debate on war and terrorism continues in those EU countries that have troops abroad, for example in Afghanistan. Of specific concern are terrorist attacks like the ETA terror in Spain.

### **Outlook**

This survey is a snapshot of current debates in the member states over the future of Europe and national EU-strategies. It takes place against a background of a number of events: on 14 July 2007, Vladimir Putin suspended the “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” (CFE Treaty) and on 30 November 2007, he signed an act of parliament relieving Russia of all duties regarding this treaty, effective from 12 December 2007. On 1 August 2007, Bulgaria and

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<sup>33</sup> Estonian chapter on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>34</sup> Finnish chapter on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Dutch, Finnish, French, and German chapters on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>36</sup> Estonian chapter on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>37</sup> Danish chapter on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>38</sup> Cf. British, Danish, Estonian, and Latvian chapters on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia (question 3).

<sup>39</sup> Local elections in Bulgaria; federal elections in Italy, cf. the respective chapters on current issues and discourses (question 5).

<sup>40</sup> For example, in Germany after elections at regional level the development of a five party system is discussed; or in Turkey the potential and EU-implications of the victory of AKP. Cf. the German and Turkish chapters on current issues and discourses (question 5).


*EU surveying the EU – the Future of Europe*, edited by Gunilla Herolf and Giji Gya

Romania became full members of Europol. On 8-9 December 2007 at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership was agreed to and on 12 December 2007, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was signed in Strasbourg. Finally, on 13 December the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Lisbon took place in Lisbon.

The survey pictures a Union that is determined to do its homework as far as the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is concerned. Some issues, that so far were only briefly noted or touched upon, will become more concrete and probably controversial in the time of the French Presidency. As far as the personnel for the new posts established by the Lisbon Treaty and their “job descriptions” are concerned, the 27 will have to look for packages that combine diverging and specific interests in order to reach a sufficient agreement and effective solutions. Also the reform of policies and of the budget will become more concrete and urgent. The significance of the European Parliament and the Commission – both to be newly elected in 2009 – will also increase. The strengthened Neighbourhood Policy and the irritations over the establishment of a new Union for the Mediterranean as well as progress and obstacles in the enlargement negotiations and the tense situation in the Western Balkans need permanent commitment and attention of the EU.

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<sup>41</sup> In collaboration with the EU-CONSENT partners: Austrian Institute of International Affairs, Vienna; Bulgarian European Community Studies Association, Sofia; Center for European Studies / Middle East Technical University, Ankara; Centre européen de Sciences Po, Paris; Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Européennes Robert Schuman, Luxembourg; Centre of International Relations, Ljubljana; Cyprus Institute for Mediterranean, European and International Studies, Nicosia; Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen; Elcano Royal Institute and UNED University, Madrid; European Institute of Romania, Bucharest; Federal Trust for Education and Research, London; Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki; Foundation for European Studies, European Institute, Łódź; Greek Centre of European Studies and Research, Athens; Groupe d’Etudes Politiques Européennes, Brussels; Institute for International Relations, Zagreb; Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon; Institute of European Affairs, Dublin; Institute of International Relations, Prague; Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius; University Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome; Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga; Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta; Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, The Hague; Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), Brussels; University of Tartu.