



ESDP and EU mission updates – March 2009

Number 43, March 2009

Current Operations Summary

*Since our last ESDP overview, there are now 16 active ESDP missions. On 15 March 2009, EUFOR Tchad/RCA will conclude, reducing to 15 the number of operating ESDP and EU missions (giving it a total of six in the Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa). When EUFOR Tchad/RCA will conclude its operation, the number of completed mission will rise to 13 – making a total of 27 ESDP and EU missions to date. This article provides an update to our June 2008 overview of past, current and planned missions and an update to the chart and table of December 2008. Please see the June 2008 and the December 2007 updates for introduction to the missions. This update provides developments from June 2008 to present. The article also includes a graphical outline and listing of missions. ISIS updates these charts regularly as part of the **ESDP Mission Analysis Partnership** www.esdpmap.org and welcomes comments from users.*

Military:

EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH - 2 December 2004 and ongoing

Operation ALTHEA is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements. The Multinational Manoeuvre Battalion (MNBN) can autonomously conduct operations to support the Bosnian authorities. Its first mission is to maintain a "SASE" (Safe And Secure Environment) and to reinforce the troops in Kosovo if required. In addition, the MNBN is mandated to assist the ICTY in detaining war criminals. In this respect, the mission has had occasional successes.

The Council of the EU stated that the "EU-led military presence would remain there for as long as necessary"¹. Whilst remembering that the EU remains ready to respond to possible security challenges. On 10 November 2008 the Council expressed deep concerns at the recent political developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina.² However, it noted that despite a difficult political situation, the security situation remained stable. A strong dichotomy is present between the security and the political situation, nationalist rhetoric and ethnic ideas are still alive in political debates.

In the long run, ALTHEA is not sustainable, despite the mission making decisive progress in the achievement of its mandate, as the political will of the EU Member States to carry on the mission will slowly erode. The mandate of ALTHEA requires a change but not too soon. This change should include a shift from military focus towards more political aspects. The Council continues working on preparatory framework for a possible change in mandate of the operation. This preparatory framework will be submitted to the Council in March 2009 so that a decision over the future of the mission can be made as soon as ALTHEA's mandate is fulfilled.

¹ Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations, 26 May 2008. Document No 9868/08 (PressRelease 141), p31. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09868.en08.pdf>

² The Council of the European Union 16686/08, "Presidency Report on ESDP". COSD 1129, PESC 1627, Civcom 692 Available at : <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/st16686.en08.pdf>

EUFOR Tchad/RCA - 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009

The transition of authority from EUFOR Chad/RCA to the UN's MINURCAT II mission on 15 March 2009 is likely to face difficulty. EUFOR managed its mission well once fully operational and is prepared to work for a smooth transition with the UN. Many of the EU Members States' personnel will stay on the ground after the 15 March take over, the troop numbers will be reduced but the core of the operation will remain. The infrastructures of EUFOR will pass on to the UN as well. However there are some doubts as to the resource capacity of the UN's command and management structures, linked to current UN mission's organisation and achievements - which have not always been positive. The troop capacity to remain is still undecided, 6000 is forecast, but this is still uncertain and will depend on the will of troop contributing countries. It is very likely that the level of work achieved by EUFOR will not be matched by MINURCAT II.

EUFOR consisted of 3700 international troops, to which 14 countries contributed armed personnel. The EU signed an agreement with Russia on 5 November 2008 which provided re-enforcement of the peacekeeping operation by 200 soldiers and four Mi-8MT helicopters.³ Where present, the operation has proved successful in stabilising areas and its presence was a re-assuring factor to the community.

After six months of operation, the Head of Mission General Nash described the situation in Chad as “volatile, unpredictable and extremely difficult to assess.”⁴ Militias and Armed Bandits are still operating in the region, threatening the population, and EUFOR's activity and presence is still necessary to protect civilians and to deliver humanitarian aid until the take-over of MINURCAT II. The sooner UN troops arrive on the ground and coordinate with EUFOR, the better the chances to not create a security vacuum.

EU NAVFOR - Operation ATALANTA – 8 December 2008 to 2 December 2009

In September 2008 the Council of the European Union established a small coordination cell in Brussels (EU NAVCO) to support surveillance and protection operations led by the EU in the Somali region. On 10 November 2008 the Council adopted a Joint Action for EU NAVFOR Somalia, the first ESDP naval military operation in order to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. The EU NAVCO cell was incorporated into EU NAVFOR.

The operation mandate includes the provision of protection to vessels chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP), and the provision of protection to merchant vessels cruising in the areas where it is deployed. The mission is to last initially for 12 months and will include up to 6 frigates and 3 maritime patrol aircrafts and 1200 personnel. The estimated cost of the mission will amount to 8.3 million.⁵

EU NAVFOR so far, has been co-coordinated well. The mission is characterised by a high level of cooperation with many different stakeholders (the UN, NATO, and nine other countries). It was rapidly set up and even though the first assessments have reported satisfactory levels of management of the mission, progress needs to be made on the level of contact between the Commanders and Headquarters. The time response between the moment an attack is reported and for defence ships to arrive on the spot is adequate. However, further co-ordination and cooperation between different stakeholders is needed to reduce the time response even more. The mission has deterred pirate activity, decreasing the numbers of attacks and highjackings, however pirate activity still remains a serious threat. The main problem remaining is the legal aspect of the mission, as pirates can only be disarmed and cannot be detained. The EU should establish arrangements with the regional countries to address this challenge.

³ “EUFOR Chad/CAR Mission: Russia sends helicopter, peacekeepers to Chad”. Available at <http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2008/12/eufor-chadcar-mission-russia-sends.html>

⁴ European Security and Defence Assembly. Document A/2021. “European Operation: an update”. 29 September 2008. Page 10. Available at: http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2021.pdf

⁵ Military operation of the EU. EU NAVFOR Somalia. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090313FactsheetEU-NAVFORSomalia-v3_EN.pdf

The biggest question is that considering the limited financial resources of the ESDP budget, should the EU invest on such a resource intense new type of operation. These resources would perhaps be better allocated in other ESDP missions which experience considerable civilian capabilities shortage.

Civilian/Military:

EUSSR Guinea-Bissau – 12 February 2008 to 31 May 2009

In June 2008, following the decision of the Council of the EU of 12 February 2008, the EU mission in support of the security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea Bissau was deployed for an original duration of 12 months. The objective of the mission is to assist in the implementation of the country's National Security Strategy (NSS).⁶

The assassination of President Joao Bernardo Vieira on 1 March 2009 has recently dominated the debates over Guinea-Bissau and may affect the EUSSR mission and questions its further development.

Prior to the assassination, the mission was supposed to be reviewed 6 months after its start, but due to the political situation and the difficult deployment in Guinea-Bissau it was postponed until February 2009. The mission had only been up and running for just under six months, making it still hard to evaluate a significant evolution in the fulfilment of the mandate. However, the mission had established ground bases of operation after a period of adaptation. The general consensus prior the assassination was that the mission was starting to show positive impacts, and it is felt that the mission would last due to the political will demonstrated by the Guinea-Bissau Government. However some commentators from Guinea-Bissau complained that the SSR mandate of the mission was an "EU thing" and did not account to the needs of the people. Thus, particularly now, the future of the mission now remains a question mark.

EUPOL Afghanistan – 30 May 2007 to 30 May 2010

Results of EUPOL Afghanistan are obviously linked to the security situation in Afghanistan, but this is in not the sole factor in its lack of results. Conflicting interests about strategies between actors in Afghanistan and EU Member States also affect the work on the ground. These conflicts are linked to the distribution of capabilities by Member States between NATO, US and EU structures. Out of 400 staff pledged or EUPOL, only 200 are present on the ground, reflecting perfectly the dissymmetry between the rhetorical political will of the Member States and their failure of providing the civilian capabilities on quantitative and qualitative (inadequate personnel skills) basis.

Inter and intra-pillar coordination is also to causing problem. The office of the EU Special Representative for Afghanistan, whose role is to coordinate the overall EU's activity, seems to not provide adequate results. This can be partly linked to the variety of stakeholders and their divisions over the strategy for police training. EUPOL is stuck between NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), some efforts of the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) – such as Norway; Germany's historical role in Afghanistan with police training; and the multi-billion dollar programmes of the US which opt for a quite different approach than EUPOL on police training⁷, consequently sidelining the mission.⁸

⁶ Giji Gya, Daniel Fiott and Liisa Vainio, "ISIS briefing note 2008:1 Responsibility to Rebuild – Guinea Bissau", www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_escg_21_esr41-guinea-bissau.pdf

⁷ See Giji Gya. "EUPOL Afghanistan - an opportunity for whom?", *European Security Review* no 33. May 2007. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_27_esr33eupolafghanistan.pdf

⁸ For a detailed analysis of the mission, see Tim Foxley, 'Where are we with the Afghan Police Force?' *European Security Review* no. 43, ISIS Europe. Page 3.

ESDP and EU mission update – March 2009, by Giji Gya and Johann Herz

The upcoming elections in August are going to add pressure on EUPOL and considering the security troubles in the country, the US, NATO and EU need to rethink their strategy in the region. See also the article by Tim Foxley of SIPRI in *European Security Review no. 43*, “Where are we with the Afghan police force?”

EUPOL RD Congo – 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2009

The Council extended the mandate of both EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo missions to June 2009, broadening the missions to the eastern provinces and revising them to include gender aspects in the stabilisation process and facilitate linkage of such to police reform and the peace process, and finally to take account of gender based violence (GBV) in the east of the country.⁹ The two missions now share one gender advisor and two more are currently being sought for Kivu and Goma. The DRC missions were widely discussed at a conference in Brussels in October 2008 on security for women in the DRC (see footnote 9) and follow-up discussion with Member States and the December 2008 review of EU implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820, has made a difference to the mission work, along with a December 2008 joint Council and Commission delegation visit to the missions. There is increased attention to the situation by Council functionnaires and the next mandate will improve integration of action against violence against women (VAW).

Due to the security instability in the region in the past months, EUPOL work has been very difficult in the east. The political situation for Kabila is still volatile and sexual violence – mainly undertaken by DRC and militia forces is increasing. But two major Congolese operations have been deployed - one in the North and one near the border of Rwanda and the DRC against the FDLR - leading to armed groups to withdraw from the region. Since the arrest of Laurent Nkunda, the situation has permitted the ESDP missions to deploy the few extra personnel as mandated in the east. They are assisting in the stabilisation plan of MONUC, which is in charge of operational concepts. EUPOL is also working with UNPOL on developing judicial police and GBV units. Further discussions are underway vis-à-vis deployment of Congolese police, financing deployment and integration into reform.

EUSEC RD Congo – 8 June 2005 to 30 June 2009

In addition to the developments outlined in the EUPOL entry above, as part of its mandate to give advice on security sector reform, EUSEC is currently finalising a census of the DRC Armed Forces. The total numbers of military staff on the payroll amounts to 160,000, but of these, there are allegedly 20-30,000 ‘non existent’ soldiers. This operation has been achieved to address corruption within the army where senior officers often have misappropriated salaries of soldiers for their own benefit. The census will hence give a base standard which should theoretically tackle corrupt practice by army personnel,¹⁰ whilst at the request of the Congolese Minister of Defence, the Council reported in December 2008 that EUSEC is also undertaking extension of the chain-of-payment project to the entire FARDC forces.¹¹ The Council is discussing a possible merger of the two missions into one entity. There has also been an increase in cooperative measures with the UN mission MONUC.

⁹ Giji Gya, Charlotte Isaksson and Marta Martinelli, “Report on ESDP missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” revised January 2009. Study Commissioned by UNIFEM for the conference “From Commitment to Action - The EU Delivering to Women in Conflict and Post-Conflict - Implementing SCR 1325 and 1820 in EU missions: Improving immediate and long-term security for women”, co-organised by the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union and UNIFEM, in cooperation with the European Commission.

Available at : http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_242_esdp&drc-gender-report.pdf

¹⁰ Laura Davis, “Justice-Sensitive Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo”. Initiative for Peacebuilding, February 2009.

¹¹ The Council of the European Union 16686/08 , “Presidency Report on ESDP”. COSD 1129, PESC 1627, Civcom 692

EUPOL COPPS – 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010

The initial 3 year mandate for the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) focused on assisting the Palestinian Civilian Police in establishing lasting and effective policing arrangements. Since September 2008, the mission increased its size by 50 personnel. In December 2008, the Council extended the mission for a further 2 years until 31 December 2010 and broadened the mission's working scope by setting up a Rule of Law section to assist the Palestinian justice system and the penitentiary sector. The section is working on the development of a comprehensive strategy for the Palestinian Justice Sector in close coordination with Palestinian partners and the existing coordination mechanism.¹² On 1 January 2009, Paul Kernaghan took over as Head of Mission with a budget set at EUR 6,200,000 for 2009.¹³

Despite a mandate extension however, the work of EUPOL COPPS is affected by the regional situation. For instance, it is not established in Gaza since the EU refuses contact with Hamas, the mandate having the Palestinian Authority as the interlocutor for the mission. Israeli and Hamas policies and actions have undermined the creation of state institutions within Palestine and this going directly against the objectives of EUPOL COPPS. One of the central problems of the mission is that there is not a united political government in Palestine and therefore there is a vast diversity of security and defence bodies in Palestine operating on different geographical and organisational levels. This factor makes the work of EUPOL COPPS very hard to coordinate and to realise significant progress.

The decreasing credibility of the US as mediator in the region leaves a vacuum which is increasingly being filled by the EU. The EU is interested politically to play a greater role in the region. However the work of the mission in Palestine does not solely depend on these bases but more importantly on progress made on inter-Palestinian reconciliation and an Israeli agreement on greater cooperation with Palestine. So the current EU's sustained political engagement is somewhat symbolic, but is reflected by the Council decision to extend EUPOL COPPS mandate until the end of 2010.

EUPM BiH – 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2009

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH) is the first and longest EU ESDP mission. Heavily criticised during its first years of operation, its results and mandate have evolved. Although the Bosnian Police meets technical level requirements, organised crime still remains on the biggest challenge for the EUPM BiH and much remains to be done. In addition the current political turmoil is hindering reforms in many areas.

Bosnian civil society is now increasingly taken into account and 'local ownership' efforts are being strengthened to include the population in the reform process.¹⁴ EUPM is making strong efforts to engage citizens with assistance in detecting crime.¹⁵

The two missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU Special Representative (EUSR) have been known to communicate very well, but the recent resignation of EUSR Miroslav Lajčák might complicate coordination and cooperation between actors. The current Austrian Ambassador to Slovenia, Valentin Inzko, may take up the role of EUSR to Bosnia Herzegovina.

EUPM's mandate ends in December 2009 and an exit of EUPM would very likely have a negative impact considering the political and criminal situation in the country. The future of EUPM BiH is closely linked to EUFOR Althea and an exit strategy for the latter is not planned in the near future. The EU wants to keep a

¹² "Rule of Law Section". EUPOL COPPS. <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/RULE%20OF%20LAW-English.pdf>

¹³ Political and Security Committee decision on EUPOL COPPS/1/2008. 16 December 2008

¹⁴ Liisa Vaino "Policing Missions: the case of EUPM", *European Security Review* no 41, November 2008.

ISIS Europe. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_205_esr41-eupm.pdf

¹⁵ "Inside the European Union Police Mission". *Mission Mag* No 59. EUPM Bosnia & Herzegovina. 18 February 2009.

crucial presence in the country and encourage Sarajevo to push for the implementation of the technical condition provided in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.

Civilian:

EULEX Kosovo – 15 June 2008 to 15 June 2010

The mission finally fully deployed in the last months of 2008, but experienced significant delays and is still looking to achieve full capacity in the coming weeks. The mission's limited progress has been to establish itself in all the regions, including the Serbian majority region in the northern province of Metrovica. The delay in deployment has been badly received by the Kosovar government - Deputy Foreign Minister, Vlora Citaku, stated that the mission should have been in place a long time ago.¹⁶

Even though EULEX Kosovo is a technical mission, it cannot be exclude itself from the political situation. The mission is caught in crossfire between Kosovars wishing that EULEX expressed itself in favour of recognising an independent Kosovo, whilst Serbia and the ethnic-Serbs from north Kosovo wish the opposite. Remaining status-neutral for the mission is a requisite to acquire confidence and fulfil its mandate fully in the Serbian majority region of Kosovo. On the other hand, the slow deployment of the mission and the EU Member States' decision to negotiate directly with Serbia on the mission deployment in the North has contributed to create a negative image of EULEX for the Kosovars themselves. EULEX presence is therefore increasingly negatively interpreted by both parties. The only way to make this uncomfortable situation turn itself around is by demonstrating its capacities rapidly and not acting as a peacekeeping operation.¹⁷ Judgment can only evolve if the mission achieves positive results in the coming months in all regions.

The mission has attempted to increase and improve dialogue with civil society, including participation with the mission's work. Being aware of the importance of the population's view of EULEX, the mission has also increased its contact with citizens on the local level. Regular meetings with local members and staff of the mission - up to the level of the Head of Mission - are designed to provide a forum for interaction and participation.¹⁸ Contacts with NGOs representing Serbian and other minorities have been established to deepen the consultation process and to integrate their vision within EULEX work when possible. This is likely to play a crucial role in affecting the way in which EULEX is perceived. EULEX has developed a full Human Rights and Gender Unit in the mission, representing a major advance in the organisation of civilian ESDP missions.¹⁹ In addition, this will facilitate EULEX's work, as having the mission securely based within a human rights and gender framework will assist in the long term objectives and sustainability in developing Kosovo's institutional infrastructure. While the handover from UNMIK is mostly finalised, the mission is still too young to be fully assessed for its success with the population.

EUJUST LEX Iraq – 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2009

Having started more than 4 years ago, the EU's Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) differs from other civilian missions. It trains Iraqis outside of Iraq but not on the ground. The mission is essentially based in Brussels and has a small cell in Baghdad. So far the Rule of Law mission has facilitated the training of close to 2000 senior Iraqi civil Servants.

¹⁶ Bulletin Quotidien Européen EU/Kosovo 9840 14/2/2009.

¹⁷ For a more in depth analysis of the mission, see article in this ESR by Vibeke B. Thomsen "One year on: what is next for Kosovo?" *European Security Review* no. 43, ISIS Europe, March 2009.

¹⁸ Mary Martin, "With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Human Security and the Challenge of Effective Multilateralism." Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2009. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/06158.pdf>

¹⁹European Communities: EU report on Human Rights 2008, page 12

Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/library/publications/HR-annual_report_2008_en.pdf

The mission remains small but is composed of highly skilled staff. The principle with this type of training mission is that they need to be long term in order to sustain good results. The strength of EUJUST LEX has been to focus on a small amount of people, but those that hold central positions within the Iraqi judiciary and security institutions, and who can make a significant positive impact back in Iraq.

On 10 November 2008 EUJUST LEX received the top award for "excellence in law enforcement and leadership" by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. However, increasing violence against police staff in Iraq; the ongoing instability; and whether the EU's training is trickling down to the actors on the ground, remains a question. There is doubt that officials, once trained, undergo any sort of monitoring, and it is difficult to ascertain whether they apply what has been learned in Brussels. However the Council has agreed to extend and reinforce the mandate, making it possible to carry assessment and pilot activities on the ground when security conditions allow.²⁰ Furthermore, some senior figures in the EU imply that EUJUST LEX may now be considering deploying within Iraq if staff safety can be ensured.

EUMM Georgia – 15 September 2008 to 15 September 2009

After the violent events of last summer in Georgia and following the signature of a cease fire by the conflicting parties on 8 September 2008, the Council adopted the Joint Action for the Europe Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EU MM Georgia) on 15 September for a period of one year.²¹ The mission was deployed on 1 October 2008, mainly in the neighbouring zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Frequent incidents of violence underline the volatile nature of the situation and the safety of EU personnel remains the priority. The mandate is to "contribute to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia."²²

Since the deployment of the mission, some progress has been achieved on confidence building between parties, but there remain major obstacles. There are significant barriers to access the break-away region and exchange of situation information with the Russian peacekeepers is still very limited. In addition South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities have also been very reluctant to communicate with EUMM.

Border:

EU BAM Rafah – 1 January 2006 to 24 November 2009

Since 15 June 2007, due to regular security threats and incidents in Hamas controlled Gaza, the EU ESDP mission working on the Rafah crossing point (the only crossing point between Gaza and Egypt) was suspended. The original mission mandate to "provide a Third Party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute, in cooperation with the Community's institution-building efforts, to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority" is obviously void at present, but the mission has still been extended. In November 2008, the Council appointed Alain Faugas as new Head of Mission with a budget of 2,5 million euro for the period 25 November 2008 to 24 November 2009. The mission has kept its operational capabilities and the Council has re-expressed the EU's determination to redeploy as soon as the conditions permit.

However, due to the current inflexibility of the different parties in the region the mission is likely to remain on standby. The necessary condition for its continuation would be an agreement between Israel, Egypt and Palestine - including Hamas - on the terms on the mission. This eventuality seems far fetched but does not remain impossible. It would require a lot of diplomatic work especially from third parties, the EU and its

²⁰ Council of the European Union 16686/08, "Presidency Report on ESDP", page 14.

²¹ Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia.

²² COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248:0026:0031:EN:PDF>

Member States (the US having lost credibility as an impartial mediator in the region) to reinstall dialogue among conflicting parties. The conditions for such a revival still remain the same. The first is inter-Palestinian reconciliation, where a strong and viable political agreement would be needed between Fatah and Hamas. The second, for Israelis to accept the re-instigation of the mission.

EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine – 1 December 2005 to 30 November 2009

The trilateral work of the EU and Ukrainian and Moldovan Customs and Borders official has achieved significant progress in strengthening the customs regime and enhancing transparency of the import and export flows²³. Smuggling of goods, drugs, weapons, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings have been reduced. Most of the illegal activity still occurs on the Transnistrian Strip (a Russian backed enclave) of the Moldovan-Ukraine border. Exchange of information and cooperation between customs personnel and the border guards of the two countries has increased, making their work more efficient²⁴.

There should be continuous efforts to strengthen the management of the border and to identify new opportunities for cooperation. Another recommendation has called for the EU to support the establishment of a system of joint control of the Transnistrian strip of the Border.²⁵ Border procedures should be amended to enable them to reach EU standards²⁶.

EUSR BST Georgia/South Caucasus – 1 September 2005 to 31 August 2009

The activities of the Border Support team in Georgia within the office of the European Union Special Representative have continued its operation in the region. The mandate of EUSR to Georgia Pierre Morel has been extended to 31 August 2009.

The missions work consists in advising the Georgian government over border and customs reforms, assisting on the drafting and the implementation of legislation and strategic papers. It has to be remembered that the EUSR BST mission has not been deployed to solve secessionist problems within Georgia, but to decrease tensions with Russia over boarder control issues. The work of the mission has been deemed valid on its advisory role to Georgian border control authorities. The crisis in Georgia had a slight effect on the operation. It entailed technical implication on its work, border control effectiveness and development of legislation being more difficult to achieve and implement in the current situation.

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²³ UNDP. Ukraine: UBAM and security services in Moldova and Ukraine to strengthen border cooperation. Available at: <http://www.undp.org.ua/en/media/41-democratic-governance/758-eubam-security-services-of-moldova-and-ukraine-to-strengthen-border-cooperation>

²⁴ Cross Border Cooperation/ Söderköping Process: Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs “EUBAM a success story”. Available at: <http://soderkoping.org.ua/page21505.html>

²⁵ Priorities in the EU-Moldova relations during the Czech Presidency of the European Union. Available at: <http://www.integrare.gov.md/file/Priorities%20for%20EU%202009.pdf>

²⁶ UNDP. Europe and CIS: Ukraine, Moldova welcome border initiative. Available at: <http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/A4CC9FCA-F203-1EE9-BCCD755AC408F113>

Table 1 – Completed missions: There will be 13 completed ESDP and EU missions as at mid-March 2009 (see below and chart for further details Future updates available from www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding). The EU has also undertaken several election observer missions – not under ESDP.

Region	Military	Civil-Military assistance / Military coord. support	Civil Police	Civil Rule of Law	Civil-Military SSR	Civil Border	Civilian Monitoring	Planning
Africa	- Artemis DRC - EUFOR RD Congo -EUFOR Tchad/RCA	- Support to AU AMIS Sudan - EUNAVCO Somalia	- EUPOL Kinshasa					
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe	- CONCORDIA FYROM		- EUPOL Proxima (FYROM) - EUPAT (FYROM)	- EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)			- EUMM Western Balkans	- EUPT Kosovo
Asia							- AMM Monitoring Mission	
Middle East								

Table 2 – Ongoing missions: As at mid-March 2009, there will be 14 active ESDP and EU missions (six in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa) see below. Total of completed and ongoing missions now reaches 27.

Region	Military	Military coordination support	Civil Police	Civil Rule of Law	Civil-Military SSR	Civil Border	Civilian Monitoring	Planning
Africa	- EU NAVFOR Somalia		- EUPOL RD Congo		- EUSEC RD Congo - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau			
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe	- EUFOR Althea BiH		- EUPM BiH - EULEX Kosovo			- EUSR BST Georgia - EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova	- EUMM Georgia	
Asia			- EUPOL Afghanistan					
Middle East			- EUPOL COPPS Palestine	- EUJUST-LEX Iraq		- EU BAM Rafah		

Chart of EU and ESDP missions to date, mid-March 2009

