



**In This Issue**

ISIS news and projects  
**Page 1**

EP Studies  
**Page 1**

Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP  
**Page 2**

One year on: what is next for Kosovo?  
**Page 5**

Where are we with the Afghan police force?  
**Page 8**

Brazil as an emerging security actor and its relations with the EU  
**Page 12**

NATO Watch Conference  
**Page 17**

ESDP and EU mission update, table and chart  
**Page 19**

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**ISIS news and projects**

ISIS continues this year to work on developments in the EU and its interfacing with regional and international partners on security and defence. France has rejoined the NATO command structure and NATO's 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary will culminate in a summit in which the new "strategic concept" will be unveiled. Parallel to this, ISIS Europe has joined NATO Watch, BASIC and the Bertelsmann Stiftung to host a Shadow NATO summit 31 March - 1 April in Brussels and to launch a "Citizen's Declaration on Alliance Security" (see the back page for registration). Advances in ESDP and EU institutional structures are examined in several articles in this ESR: the first, one of our series of Briefing Notes, which summarises and elaborates on the recent European Security Contact Group meeting, "Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP". We also have analyses on two ESDP missions and their situations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as exploring the human security concept further across the Atlantic with an article on Brazil as an emerging security actor and its relations with the EU. Our usual European Parliament Updates for January and February are sent out separately, but always available on our website. Finally, the latest ESDP and EU Mission update with table and chart, which forms the basis of the new ESDP Mission Analysis Partnership – a network of researchers that aims to bring together analysis on the many facets of civilian crisis management – [www.esdpmap.org](http://www.esdpmap.org).

**EP studies**

In this edition of ESR we present the final two studies for the European Parliament. The first by Dr. Paul Cornish examines **Cyber-Security and Politically, Socially and Religiously Motivated Cyber-Attacks**, focusing on the European Union as an international organisation with a fragmented yet developing interest in cyber-security. The paper assesses the source and nature of cyber threats; reviews current multilateral initiatives to address cyber-security; and finally examines European Union's responses to the cyber-security challenge. It concludes that the EU's responses are diverse, lack coherence and could at times conflict, and recommends seeking a more efficient coordination of efforts, whilst maintaining institutional and role specialisations with an

"EU-wide Common Operating Vision for cybersecurity".

The second study is by Dr. John Hart on **political and technical challenges posed by sea-dumped chemical and conventional weapons: the case of the Baltic Sea**. The paper outlines the potential environmental and human health effects resulting from the dumping of World War I and World War II-era conventional and chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea. Dr. Hart notes that it is not possible to identify and safely recover or otherwise 'remediate' all of the munitions that have been dumped, and concludes that therefore, procedures for the identification and reporting of recovered munitions should be maintained and, where possible, strengthened. The paper recommends that any policy approach to the recovery and remediation of dumped munitions should be reasoned and balanced. Any decision to recover or remediate dumped munitions should be informed by technical and scientific requirements, and any policy process should be guided by these principles. Further efforts should be carried out to achieve common understanding on risk (quantitative and qualitative) and the implementation of appropriate risk management strategies.

The Parliamentary Studies are available on our website at: [www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=epu#studies](http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=epu#studies)

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## ISIS Briefing Note 2009:1

### Tapping the Human Dimension: Civilian Capabilities in ESDP

*This briefing is linked to our series of European Security Contact Group meetings investigating new engagements for ESDP. This briefing summarises our examination of civilian capabilities of ESDP and commitments to improvement.*

The number of ESDP missions has increased and their scope of activity has widened in the past years. Capabilities have been at the centre of the debate on ESDP missions, but the focus has been overshadowed by military capabilities, monopolising the debate at the expense of civilian capabilities. This is a significant contradiction considering the fact that twelve out of fifteen current ESDP and EU missions are civilian.<sup>1</sup>

The Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt stated: *“Although the military missions are often seen as the most demanding, it is often the deployment of the more political and civilian ones that are the most challenging. While we have standing military units ready to go notably the two EU Battle Groups ready to deploy within 10 days - we don't have policemen, judges, lawyers or different instructors ready in the same way.”*<sup>2</sup>

ESDP missions consist of staff from a multitude of countries and backgrounds. Commander of Eurocorps, Lieutenant General Pedro Pitarch, when asked vis-à-vis challenges for missions answered: *“Multinationality is perhaps in itself something that could be considered a weakness on a daily basis because it is easier to command a national unit than a multinational one. There are differences in status, in rules and even in period of leave.”*<sup>3</sup> But the multinational character of the mission should not be considered a negative aspect. The EU Member States have the potential to be at the forefront of civilian crisis management, but harmonisation and common training are essential.

#### The challenges

Challenges for civilian capabilities include:

- the civilian know-how and institutional memory often disappears after the end of a mission;
- harmonising skills and knowledge, plus improving expertise;

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<sup>1</sup> ISIS Europe, Chart & Table of ESDP missions [www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding](http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding) ESDP Mission Analysis Partnership [www.esdpmmap.org](http://www.esdpmmap.org)

<sup>2</sup> Carl Bildt, “Strengthening the ESDP – The EU’s approach to International Security”, Helsinki, September 2008. [www.regeringen.se/sb/d/7417/a/112759](http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/7417/a/112759)

<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant General Pedro Pitarch in *European Diplomacy and Defence*, No. 172, 30 October 2008.

- common training and lessons learned need to be built and followed-up.

There is now a strong need for the EU to address professional skills in the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) and establish a clear vision of how the External Action Service will be set up once the Treaty of Lisbon is finally implemented, and even before.

#### The debate

ISIS Europe held a European Security Contact group on 4 March 2009 to ask these very questions. Our speakers were Lieutenant General Patrick de Rousiers, French military representative to the European Union Military Committee; Mika-Markus Leinonen, Directorate General E IX – Civilian Crisis Management, Council of the European Union and Jiří Pavlíček, Relex Counsellor, Head of CFSP/ESDP Unit, Czech Permanent Representation to the EU. The meeting was hosted by MEP Janusz Onyszkiewicz (ALDE).

Discussions from this meeting focussed on problematics such as: **division of labour; partnerships; collective work; common training and exercises for personnel.** There is a need to embed a cultural change in civilian crisis management (CCM) and to develop civilian and military planning synergies. Notably, adequate division of civilian and military tasks is essential – as missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown.<sup>4</sup> But firstly, a common definition of what encompasses “civilian” should be developed – which would also address the current confusion over division of labour.

Developments for civilian capabilities have not improved since the first **Civilian Headline Goal** (see box below). The first CHG being theoretical in what would be needed for CCM, it is only now that the gaps for civilian capabilities have been ascertained. Furthermore, the EU is also suffering overload with ESDP missions and EU Member States now face problems of personnel rotation and doing more with less. Quality across-the-board EU training and the support structures for planning and deployment are still nascent.

There is also the question of the **choice for EU Member States pledging civilian personnel** for an

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<sup>4</sup> Kristina Rintakoski and Mikko Autti, editors. Workshop report “Transatlantic co-operation in civilian crisis management”, Crisis Management Initiative November 2007.

ESDP mission versus being needed in their own State, or even for other peace operations by the UN, OSCE or various “coalitions-of-the-willing”. Although there are some 1.6 million EU personnel available, only 5000 are pledged and 2000 deployed because of competing demands. The reasoning for Member States to commit resources and personnel for civilian missions needs to be strongly justified if citizens and parliamentarians are to agree to both the financial and human resource expense for ESDP missions. This is especially so as the **ESDP budget** has plunged from 285 million euro in 2008 to 243 million euro in 2009. Training and selecting personnel and ensuring consistent quality is a challenge and incentives are needed to sell the importance and worth of CCM. But the EU mustn't forget that political will is also linked to financial resource challenges.

The **human dimension** has also been neglected – perhaps almost sacrificed - for EU “visibility”. The need to be seen on-the-ground, and quickly, means that some missions have not fully thought through what expertise is needed; where it is needed; and given ample time to provide harmonisation and proper contextual pre-deployment training for personnel. Also needed is an ESDP review vis-à-vis per diems, hardship pay and risk elements that personnel undertake.

From a **strategic point of view**, a shift towards the notions of the **human security, gender and human rights perspectives** of CCM also beg the question of what sort of concepts, resources and procurement the EU needs for missions. Tacking on as an afterthought framework such as: international humanitarian law; civilian participation in security sector reform; and gender perspectives - only if there is sufficient budget or “relevance” - is a poor strategy for concretising the basis for missions to protect the population. These facets need to be integrated from pre-planning stage for mission success, as well as to foment local capacity building, so that the population feels “engaged” in sorting out their own backyard. Human security can be used as an “organising concept” binding and explaining the core aim of a holistic EU approach.<sup>5</sup>

**Lessons learnt** from civilian missions are extremely useful, but still not systematised and disseminated. However both the Council and the Commission are developing database systems for future internal use. Furthermore, the situation contexts are not being strategically tackled *collectively* by engaging (or knowing *how* to engage) all stakeholders, including NGOs and the private sector.

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<sup>5</sup> Sven Biscop, “The European Security Strategy: How to do it”, in Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth and Bastian Giegerich, editors, *Europe: A time for Strategy*. Egmont Paper 27, January 2009.

## A permanent resource

In November 2008, EU Heads of State agreed to investigate strategies for CCM and the review of the European Security Strategy in December 2008 also encompassed a “**Declaration of Strengthening Capabilities**”.<sup>6</sup> The Declaration announced *inter alia* desire for the EU to have the capability of “two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by up to 10,000 troops for at least two years” and “around a dozen ESDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts) which could last several years”.

However, the EU needs to carefully restructure the dynamic of ambition versus possibilities for CCM. A Civilian Peace Corps has been discussed, but is not yet on the table, as Member States need to be convinced of viability and to commit the ability to roster experts. The establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is one step towards improving infrastructure and command for civilian ESDP missions. The future merger of DGE8 (military) and DGE9 (civilian) into the Civilian Military Planning Directorate (CMPD – to be completed in 2010) will be another improvement towards synergising civ-mil capabilities, although there is criticism that this may lead to a militarisation of civilian tasks.

The Council General Secretariat (CGS) are developing a system for civilian rostering which they should link with training needs. The CGS has also increased its internal capacity to 3300 staff. December 2008 also saw a decision to increase support and structure for the European Security and Defence College and discussion of integrating it with the (civilian) European Group on Training.

A civilian-to-civilian approach must be pursued including clearer joint strategy and partnering with the Commission's competencies for a long-term comprehensive approach. As such, the future External Action Service (EAS – see box below) should plan lessons learnt, strategic frameworks and engaged cooperation into its proposed structure now.

A new European Parliament must also carefully balance budgetary commitments with a human security focus, and inter-Parliamentary work should also be instigated for common EU approaches to CCM.

*By Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe*

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<sup>6</sup>[www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf)

### Fact points – Civilian Headline Goal

There are four priorities areas of civilian capabilities of ESDP, identified by the European Council in Feira in June 2000: police; rule-of-law; civilian administration and civilian protection, the Council also setting numerical targets for personnel. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), supposedly confirmed the importance of EU capacity for civilian crisis management with a flourish that the EU “could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities”.

In 2004, developing civilian capabilities for ESDP was instrumentalised with the first Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008. The aim of the CHG is to enable the EU to “conduct several civilian ESDP missions including at least one large civilian substitution mission at short notice in a non-benign environment”. Two extra categories of civilian capabilities – monitoring and support to EUSR - were also added. The CHG identified a shortfall in capacity of: judges and prosecutors; prison personnel; police officers (junior and middle management level) and border police officers (junior level). The CHG also proposed Civilian Response Teams (CRT), to be drawn from pre-selected, pre-trained pool of experts.

The next Civilian Headline Goal (CHG 2010) was launched on 1 January 2008 and adds to the CHG 2008 the needs for developed concepts, planning and conduct capabilities, and equipment. In addition, the CHG 2010 concentrates on improving: lessons learned processes; training; mission support; procurement; field security; rapidly deployable police elements, such as Integrated Police Units and Formed Police Units (IPU and FPU); evaluation of the Civilian Response Teams; and mainstreaming gender perspectives and human rights. There is also a push to further develop information and intelligence sharing, technological tools and protection of personnel. Increasing synergies are highlighted, such as: common illustrative scenarios for CCM (eg SSR); closer work with the third pillar (including EUROPOL and EUROJUST); and cooperation with other states, regional and international institutions, NGOs and civil society. Assessment is also integrated into CHG 2010, including yearly reports on "Civilian Preparedness" and "Civilian Capability Targets".

### Proposed External Action Service

Under the proposed Constitutional Treaty, the EU was to establish a European External Action Service (EAS), a proposal that has followed through to the Lisbon Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the new position of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EUHR) would simultaneously be the chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice President of the European Commission. This position would be assisted by the proposed EAS, hence in theory joining the Council and Commission more firmly in acting under the rubric of an EU common security and defence policy, with common staff. The EAS would also provide the delegation staff across some 125 countries.

Preparations and planning for the EAS are already underway and the cultural change mentioned in this article should also be a fundamental basis on which to build an EAS. Particular attention should be paid to merging the already existing staff and structures (CMPD, CPCC, SitCen, SatCen, DG Relex Crisis Room, Council Human Rights Unit, Council Policy Unit etc), and the EU should pay careful attention to the human aspects and pitfalls of organisational change. Training and personnel expertise should also be harmonised, and be consistent with the high diplomatic standards of EU Member States, perhaps through a civilian “diplomatic” Erasmus programme.

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## One year on: what is next for Kosovo?

*As Kosovo celebrated its one-year anniversary on 17 February 2009, a common EU position has still not been achieved and serious concerns regarding the future of the province remain. The mandate of the EU mission on the ground is still a subject of debate while Kosovo is faced with continuing economic, ethnic and social challenges.*

### One Year Status

As Kosovo celebrated its first year of existence on 17 February 2009, it continues to be faced with major challenges both internally and on the international scene: the EU has not been able to form a common position regarding the independence of the province; less countries have recognized Kosovo than originally expected; and most importantly, Kosovo is still faced with major economic, social and minority rights challenges.

The status question still remains on the table, and will continue to do so until the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is received, probably after mid 2010.<sup>1</sup> This is despite the uncertainty being pushed aside by a number of Western representatives, including Cameron Munter, the US Ambassador to Serbia<sup>2</sup>, who argues that this question has been resolved. While the ICJ opinion cannot and will not be legally binding on any party, officials on both sides agree that a clear statement in favour of the legality of the independence declaration is highly improbable. Serbia argues that it has opted for a judicial strategy and non-confrontational approach (i.e. advisory opinion instead of a contentious case against an individual state) in order not to complicate its integration into the EU. Serbia also hopes that an advisory opinion will pave the way for a new round of negotiations.

However, until the final status question is resolved, Kosovo will continue to lack the international legitimacy needed for its development and its relations with Serbia and other countries in the region will remain strained. Moreover, Kosovo's accession to international organisations, most importantly the UN

and the OSCE, and possibly even the EU, will remain difficult, and in some cases, impossible.

Furthermore, beyond the status question, Kosovo's progress in the economic, social and judicial fields remain limited. In December 2008, the Council of the EU praised the progress achieved in certain areas, notably the adoption of many laws, but noted that major challenges persist and progress must be made in strengthening of institutions and the rule of law, protection of the Serb and other minorities, the fight against corruption and organised crime, budgetary and fiscal reform and the improvement of living conditions. The Council further encouraged a constructive attitude towards regional cooperation<sup>3</sup>.

### Kosovo: a Dangerous Precedent?

When Kosovo unilaterally declared independence over a year ago, the US and most European countries insisted on labelling Kosovo a unique case. It was emphasised that Kosovo could not in any manner serve as a precedent to other breakaway regions throughout the world or in the region. One year later, discussions as to whether Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has opened the way to increased disintegrative tendencies and contributed to augment tension in the region or whether it has had no or limited effects on other such provinces continue to rage. Nicholas Whyte<sup>4</sup> argues that the recognition by the Russian authorities of the independence of South Ossetia following the Russo-Georgian conflict of August 2008, was prompted by the conflict itself and not by the international community's recognition of Kosovo's independence. While Russia might have instrumentalised Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence to justify its own recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and justify the conflict in Georgia, it runs against Russia's long-term interests to accept and support such a new world, notably as it might legitimise secessionist movements in Russia, for example within Chechnya.

Initial fears that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence would lead to further disintegration of existing borders in the Balkans have until this date proven to be largely unfounded. However, political pressures continue to feed off division in the region. For example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is home to three ethnic groups (Bosnian Serbs, Bosniaks

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<sup>1</sup> In August 2008, Serbia sought an opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of Kosovo's independence and has stated that it will abide by the decision of the court. After Serbia's initiative, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/Res/63/3 on 8 October 2008, also requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on whether the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo was in accordance with international law.

<sup>2</sup> Cameron Munter, US Ambassador interview with Politika, 2 February 2009, as reported in the Washington Times <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/03/embassy-row-82545981/>

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<sup>3</sup> Press Release: Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans, 2915<sup>th</sup> External Relations Council meeting, 8 and 9 December 2008.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with Dr. Nicholas Whyte, Director of the Brussels office of Independent Diplomat, 29 January 2009.

and Bosnian Croats), Milorad Dodik, the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska (RS) and leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, demands the right to a referendum on RS independence. At the same time, Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak Member of the State Presidency and Head of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to insist on the abolition of RS and calls for the creation of a centralised state<sup>5</sup>. Thus, the debate on the independence of Republika Srpska is still ongoing internally, but it doesn't appear to have been revived by Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence.

However, in the long-term future, such an acceptance is likely to be challenged by secessionist groups across the world. Such a claim could be strengthened if the partition of Kosovo along the Ibar River is permitted by states which have recognised the independence of Kosovo. While the international community has clearly expressed that such a partition would be unacceptable as it would unleash separatist claims in the Balkans and probably lead to the continued disintegration of internal borders in the region, the current situation and lack of control by Pristina over the province of Mitrovica continue to be a source of major concern. The stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in the north is therefore a crucial test of competence for the recently deployed EULEX mission.

### **The EU in Kosovo: a Delayed EULEX Mission**

The EULEX mission, which deployed with great delay during the last months of 2008 and is still working to reach full capacity in the coming weeks, was able to achieve its first, but limited, success when it reached an agreement to deploy in all the provinces of Kosovo, including in the northern province of Mitrovica. While Serbia remained highly reluctant to see the mission deployed in the Serb enclaves of Kosovo, the eagerness of the Serbian government to get closer to the EU and not see its accession ambitions blocked, permitted the deployment of the mission throughout the whole country.

Main disagreements as to the very nature of the mission nevertheless persist between the two sides. While the government of Kosovo wishes to see EULEX position itself clearly in favour of recognising an independent Kosovo and play a role in the implementation of the constitution, Serbia and the ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo want to see the mission remain neutral towards the status question. While the deployment of EULEX was accepted by Serbia in the north of Kosovo on the condition it remains status neutral, the mission will only gain confidence with the

<sup>5</sup> Bosnia's Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe. International Crisis Group, Europe Report 9 March 2009.

Serbian population once it has demonstrated it will remain so. However, such neutrality will be difficult to maintain and unity among EU Member States might erode, leading to "schizophrenia" within the mission as to its mandate and concrete activities it is expected to perform.

Furthermore, the slow and much delayed start of the mission, combined with EU Member States' decision to negotiate directly with the Serbian authorities on the mission's deployment in the north, has contributed to forming a negative image of EULEX among the entire Kosovar population. As noted by Ilir Deda, Research Director of the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED)<sup>6</sup>, it is central that the mission demonstrates its capacities rapidly. While its achievements in the north will be a test case and will determine its success, it has not yet undertaken the promised dialogue with the population and with civil society, especially in the north where it is most needed. As the perception of EULEX by the population will depend on its performance in the coming months, further outreach activities towards the Serbian population in the north are needed.

Moreover, while the takeover by EULEX of UNMIK's capacities is mostly finalised, technical complications continue as UNMIK retains a phantom presence and can not depart the province as it must continue to operate under the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. However, despite the continued but limited presence of UNMIK, the vast majority of projects - notably in the field of justice, state-building and police training - will fall under the mandate of EULEX, while NATO is responsible for the training of the newly formed Kosovo Security Force.

### **Kosovo Security Force: A Step Towards Increased Statehood?**

On 21 January 2009, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was officially launched and replaced the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The preparations for the formation of the security force, which is meant to include some minority ethnic Serbs but is expected to be dominated by ethnic Albanians, started in March 2008. The KSF, which has not been deployed in the Northern part of Kosovo, will be engaged in tasks such as civil protection and crisis response. The 2500-strong force is being trained and overseen by NATO, which has 15,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo and will, for the time being, retain ultimate responsibility for security in Kosovo.

Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremic, has stated that this force constitutes "an illegal paramilitary group"

<sup>6</sup> Phone interview with Ilir Deda, Research Director of KIPRED, 2 February 2009.

and “a direct threat to national security, peace and stability in the region”<sup>7</sup>. Serbian officials, who argue that the KSF is not encompassed in UNSCR 1244, have expressed their discontent because the KSF is composed of former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and later members of the Kosovo Protection Force (KPC) who fought against Serbian soldiers in the 1998-99 war.

Some commentators argue that the KSF constitutes the major obstacle to NATO/Serbia relations. Whilst the Serbian Army and KFOR continue to develop solid professional cooperation, Serbia argues that NATO’s decision to task KFOR to establish and train KSF is contrary to KFOR’s mandate established by UNSCR 1244. Serbia and NATO further disagree on the nature of the KSF: whether it is a security force or a proper army. While Serbia wishes, aside from the presence of status-neutral international forces, to see a demilitarised Kosovo, NATO became involved in the creation of KSF, which is allegedly perceived by Pristina as Kosovo’s future army<sup>8</sup>.

While some international observers would favour a demilitarised Kosovo, others argue that if this is the case, Kosovo would be left unarmed and unprotected once the international peacekeeping forces depart the province. Furthermore, it is likely that a potential support of the international community for a demilitarised Kosovo would further the illegal spread of small arms. It might also make the proper regulation of post-war weapons and the rehabilitation of former soldiers increasingly difficult.

While the situation on the final status of Kosovo persists in limbo, the creation of the KSF appears as yet another step towards increased statehood. Therefore, the KFOR force of NATO, which is responsible for the training of this new force, is in a difficult position, as some Members of NATO do not recognise the independence of the province. Spain, for example, has declared that it will not participate in the training of the force. The KSF is, in this sense, a striking illustration of Kosovo’s unsettled status and continued tensions within the region and beyond. It also exemplifies the difficult relations Kosovo has with its larger neighbour, Serbia.

### Relations with Serbia

As Serbia announced in January 2009 its plan to bid for EU membership during the Czech Presidency, the remaining major obstacles to future EU membership for Serbia are full cooperation with ICTY and Serbia’s

<sup>7</sup> Kosovo’s security force launched. BBC News, 21 January 2009. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukfs\\_news/hi/newsid\\_7840000/newsid\\_7841700/7841789.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_7840000/newsid_7841700/7841789.stm)

<sup>8</sup> Interview with a government official.

attitude vis-à-vis Kosovo. As disputes between a Member State and a candidate country - such as the ongoing border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia and the long-lasting disagreement between Greece and Macedonia on the constitutional name of Macedonia - have forced their way to the forefront of EU politics, the EU will certainly do its utmost to avoid similar situations in future negotiations.

Although the EU will not be able to request that Serbia recognises Kosovo before joining the EU, a clause could potentially be inserted so as to avoid Serbia blocking the entry of Kosovo in the EU in the long-term future. The optimal solution would be to see the entire region within the EU. As Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, stated in a press conference with Boris Tadic, President of Serbia, “the EU’s objective is to improve and support the social and economic development of Kosovo in order to avoid seeing Kosovo become a black hole for crime and trafficking”<sup>9</sup>. However, although new negotiations on the status are possible, some are quite certain that no Serbian government will recognise Kosovo as an independent state. Serbia will nevertheless be required to make institutional changes, including a modification to its constitution before joining the EU, so that it no longer holds rights on Kosovo.

### Towards Increased Recognition?

Only five Member States of the EU have not recognised the independence of Kosovo: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. As Ilir Deda points out, the overall recognition process in Kosovo was disadvantaged by two factors: a division within the EU and an outgoing US administration. However, Romania and Slovakia have recognised passports issued by Kosovo and, as some observers point out, an improvement of the internal situation on Cyprus might also remove reluctance of recognition of Kosovo’s independence. While observers argue that those countries could be persuaded to recognise Kosovo, the most reluctant and problematic country continues to be Spain, who has blocked the Feasibility Study initiated by the European Commission. As long as all EU Member States do not recognize Kosovo, the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement is not feasible.

While bilateral relations between Serbia and countries recognising Kosovo have been strained, all Serbia’s Ambassadors who were recalled for consultation from countries that recognised Kosovo, have now returned to their posts. However, the situation with Montenegro and Macedonia remains different from a Serbian

<sup>9</sup> “Serbia okay on Kosovo in financial bodies: president.” EU Business, 12 February 2009. <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1234452722.67/>

perspective, as the recognition of Kosovo from these two countries came after the UN had agreed to refer the case to the ICJ. Serbia perceived this act as particularly unfriendly and decided to proclaim Ambassadors from Skopje and Podgorica *persona-non-grata* in Belgrade. However, Serbian officials praised the reinstating of better relations with those neighbours in recent weeks.

The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, believes that further recognition will come from numerous countries and that its neighbour Serbia will also eventually recognise Kosovo in 2009, arguing that mutual recognition and cooperation is the best way forward. Thaci stated Kosovo's readiness to open an embassy in Belgrade and hoped for reciprocal steps from Serbia.

### What Future for the New State?

A priority for Kosovo is to finalise its statehood and seek recognition from other countries worldwide through intense diplomatic efforts. Increased recognition will, however, continue to be blocked by disunity within the EU. As Ilir Deda points out, a number of countries look to the EU for guidance on a position to adopt towards recognition, leading South American allies to refuse recognition until Spain does. The unclear EU position is most certainly to the greatest disadvantage of Kosovo. Furthermore, as the EU is attempting to be the central major actor in the region, the success or failure of Kosovo as an independent state will, in both cases, fall under the

responsibility of the EU and as consequence will reflect on the Union.

As Prime Minister Hashim Thaci stated in an interview with Euronews,<sup>10</sup> the future of Mitrovica is the future of Kosovo. He argued that only an extremist minority continues to pose problems in the North, as most Serbs are part of the institutions of Kosovo. Examining the state-wide deployment of EULEX throughout Kosovo, including the North, Thaci confirmed that there will be no room for parallel, illegitimate structures within Kosovo and noted that a final solution to the status of the Mitrovica region must be found in the near future.

While EULEX will play a central role in the future development of Kosovo, not only in the field of police and justice, but also in overall policies and actions, it will most importantly be confronted with the status question in the very near future and preserving neutrality on the matter, as desired by Serbia, will be increasingly difficult. Finally, ensuring and strengthening a unified position between EU Member States will constitute a key instrument for the EU's credibility and for the future of Kosovo on the international scene. Most importantly, the mission will also be a crucial test case for the EU and for future EU missions on the ground.

*By Vibeke Brask Thomsen, Programme Officer, ISIS Europe*

<sup>10</sup> Euronews interview of Hashim Thaci, by Jon Davies, European Affairs Reporter, Euronews. Available on [www.euronews.net](http://www.euronews.net)

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## Where are we with the Afghan police force?

Most of Afghanistan is still not served by a coherent, functioning and corruption-free police force. In some parts of the country, the Taliban are starting to fill the gap in demand for basic law and order. However, international efforts to address the development of the new national police force - through Security Sector Reform, the work of PRTs and EU and individual national contributions - are likely to remain fragmented. This article explores these many facets including the EUPOL mission.

### Introduction

*'We have built the police into a less well-armed, less well-trained version of the Army and launched them into operations against the insurgents. Meanwhile, nobody is doing the job of actual policing-rule of law, keeping the population safe...civil and criminal law enforcement...the Taliban have stepped into this gap...'* David Kilcullen, November 2008

*One patrolman confided to his trainer that he never knew beating his wife was illegal.<sup>1</sup>*

In the 1990s the corruption of law and the break down of order was a major contributing factor in the rise of the Taliban. In the seven years since the removal of the Taliban regime, most of Afghanistan is still not served by a police force. There are two main reasons for this: the sheer extent of destruction and neglect suffered by Afghan government institutions after many years of conflict and the failure of the international community to recognise what was needed and to implement a coherent plan. As a result, large numbers of the population in Afghanistan perceive themselves as unable to access law and order unless they turn to the Taliban, who are increasingly filling this 'justice vacuum' with their own interpretation of Sharia law.

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<sup>1</sup> Baker, A., 'Policing Afghanistan', *Time* 21 Oct. 2008  
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1852296,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics>

The speedy and effective development of the Afghan police force, therefore, is crucial.

### The scale of the problem

*'How do you reduce crime in Afghanistan? Get rid of the police!'* apocryphal Afghan joke

For at least a couple of decades, the Afghan police have been synonymous with perpetrating crime rather than preventing it. In the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, there was no nation-wide police force. Although uniforms, infrastructure and police nomenclature were evident across the country – a legacy of the Soviet era, and before – bands of armed men calling themselves police were almost universally used as the enforcement arm of local warlords. They kept the peace by way of dealing with opponents of the warlord, raising “taxes” through a range of illegal activities and generally suppressing trouble. Militia commanders took on the titles of “Chief of Police” and customs posts and checkpoints were seen as lucrative money earners, to be bought or seized.

However, in the efforts to create effective security institutions in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police (ANP) was (and still is) routinely neglected in favour of the Afghan National Army (ANA).<sup>2</sup> Given the early weaknesses of the new Afghan government and administration, it was judged important to focus on generating independent military forces loyal to the new government rather than remain dependent on the fluid allegiances of local warlords.

As a result, the money and resources that flooded into the fledgling ANA from 2002 only trickled into the ANP. Where the ANA was started from scratch and vetting all personnel, the ranks of the police became an escape route for former militia fighters and local warlords fearful of losing their powerbases. Underfunded, many police units became in effect uniformed bandits, establishing checkpoints to levy unofficial taxes as the only means of securing an income.

Only recently has the imbalance of effort been redressed. A US Congressional report indicates that between 2002 and 2008, the ANA will have received approximately \$10 billion and the ANP around \$6 billion.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, the contributions of other nations to the ANP reportedly amount to less than \$400

<sup>2</sup> The Afghan National Police (ANP) are taken in this article as comprising Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). There are other smaller organisations, such as criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs.

<sup>3</sup> US GAO, ‘Afghanistan security’, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-08-661, June 2008, p. 11, <<http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661>

million.<sup>4</sup> The ANP remains inefficient, poorly trained, riddled with corruption and low in morale.<sup>5</sup> Its parent ministry and command headquarters, the Interior Ministry, is in a similar condition. The ANP is still several years away from meeting its training and capability goals and perhaps as many years away again from regaining the much-needed consent and trust of the population. Additional difficulties have surfaced since 2006 – the resurgence of the Taliban has seen them on the front line of the counter-insurgency war – and suffering the most casualties, to the detriment of morale, recruitment and retention rates.<sup>6</sup>

The United States Government Accountability Office further noted that ‘...no police unit is assessed as fully capable of performing its mission... ..Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders effective policing, and our analysis of status reports from the field indicates that the ANP consistently experiences problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks, including by insurgents.’<sup>7</sup>

Given the involvement of dozens of nations and institutions in the creation of this new police force, including the EU, the PRTs, Germany and the US, there will remain question marks over how well coordinated efforts will be and what the end result will look like.<sup>8</sup> It is perhaps worth looking at some of the main efforts thus far to create an Afghan national police force.

### SSR and the “lead nation” concept - the Germans struggle...

In 2002, as part of the international community’s efforts to rebuild Afghan government capacity, reform of the Afghan security sector was divided into five distinct “pillars” – reform of the Defence Ministry and creation of a national army, reform of the Interior Ministry and the creation of a national police force, reform of the judiciary, Counter Narcotics and disarmament. Each nation took one pillar. Germany

<sup>4</sup> *ibid*

<sup>5</sup> ‘the practice of corrupt and politically motivated appointments, misappropriation of funds or equipment, involvement in drug trafficking and high desertion rates continue to undermine the reform of the police.’, Report on the Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact by the Joint Coordination And Monitoring Board (JCMB), 12 June 2008.

<sup>6</sup> Cohen, T., ‘...police deaths account for nearly 60 per cent of friendly forces casualties. Last year [2007] alone, 925 of them were killed...’, ‘Afghan security forces bear brunt of casualties but resolve to fight is firm’, *CNews*, 30 Oct. 2008, <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2008/10/30/7255136-cp.html>

<sup>7</sup> US GAO, ‘Afghanistan security’, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-08-661, June 2008, p. 31. <<http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661>

<sup>8</sup> Packer, G., ‘Kilcullen on Afghanistan: “It’s still winnable, but only just.”’, Kilcullen quoted in *The New Yorker*, 14 Nov. 2008, <<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2008/11/kilcullen-on-af.html>

stepped forward to take the lead with the Interior Ministry and the police.

The 'Lead Nation' concept is now widely acknowledged to have been weak - each nation approached their particular area with differing concepts, understanding, expectations and resources. German performance in developing the ANP was sluggish. There was a failure to recognise the scale of the problem - to be fair, something that much of the international community was guilty of. The German approach was limited financially, confining itself to co-ordination of police reform rather than necessarily implementing it.

### ... but the US picks up the slack

In the end, the scale of the US financial contribution for police reform completely dominated and German and US initiatives became uncoordinated.<sup>9</sup> From 2005, although Germany remained engaged in efforts to support police training in Afghanistan, the US took over formal responsibility for the development of the ANP. In 2007, the Focused District Development (FDD) concept was initiated and funding levels revised accordingly.

The ultimate destination of the ANP - how big will it be and what will it do - remains unclear. A target of 62,000 police force, to be reached in 2007, was revised upwards to 82,000. However, the International Crisis Group notes that:

*'...numbers cited are not necessarily present on the ground...Between 2003 and 2008 there have been 149,000 trainees...[but] The UN estimated around 57,000 police on the ground; others as low as 35,000'*<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps more importantly, given the increasingly strong Taliban resurgence and the pressing need for combat troops to tackle the insurgents, the dominance of police funding by the US and the dominance of training from US soldiers, there looks to be a danger that the police will be little more than a military force rather than providers of law and order.

### A variety of solutions - the PRTs try to engage

In the frequent absence of national or local police training programmes, the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams have made efforts to engage with and assist in the development of local police units. These efforts were rarely structured, planned or

<sup>9</sup> Wilder, A., 'Cops or Robbers: the struggle to reform the ANP', Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007, pp. 25-26.

<sup>10</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Policing in Afghanistan: still searching for a strategy', *ICG Asia Briefing No. 85*, 18 Dec. 2008, p.2.

coordinated, either with each other or with the Afghan government. Most efforts were dependent upon the contributions made by individual PRT members. This author witnessed the efforts of Norwegian police officers in Faryab province, in the summer of 2008. The Norwegian police were funded by, and reported to, their own Justice Ministry, making for some difficulties in securing funds resources on a timely basis - or even at all.

Efforts were, of necessity, often aimed at the most basic of requirements - provision of pens and papers for classrooms, accommodation buildings and reinforced checkpoints. While the police undoubtedly possessed shiny new vehicles and uniforms - certainly in the provincial capital - basic skills such as leadership, management, delegation and initiative were in shorter supply. In less accessible parts of the province, where the police were routinely targeted by insurgent groups, reports were even less encouraging - casualties were high, morale was low and desertion rates, drug abuse and corruption at extremely worrying levels.<sup>11</sup>

### EUPOL - 'too little too late'?

A hastily put together EU mission, EUPOL<sup>12</sup>, intended to help mentor the ANP sits somewhere uneasily between the local PRT efforts and the large scale, multi-billion dollar programme of the US without any apparent clear understanding of how it is to contribute. One EU representative close to the programme described it as "too little, too late" and, indeed, it is difficult to find anyone with anything good to say about the EU's contribution at all. The organisation appears unable to find sufficient personnel to fill their own limited staff aspirations - as of September 2008 they reportedly had only 183 staff out of a target of 240 - this in the face of US requests for as many as 3,000 trainers.<sup>13</sup>

There still remain question marks over how and why the EUPOL mission was created as well as doubts over its resources, capabilities and role. The mission is still struggling to achieve the limited staffing levels it set itself and risks becoming a minor footnote at best and a wasteful distraction of effort at worst, in the face of overwhelming US resources working in a different direction. Personnel in the mission undoubtedly possess some valuable police expertise which might be usefully employed if they were able to integrate with the US effort, which is using primarily military trainers to train the ANP.

<sup>11</sup> Author's observations and interviews, Faryab province, July 2008.

<sup>12</sup> For previous ISIS research on EUPOL see Giji Gya, "EUPOL Afghanistan: an opportunity for whom?" *European Security Review* no 33. By Giji Gya May 2007. [http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007\\_artrel\\_27\\_esr33eupolafghanistan.pdf](http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2007_artrel_27_esr33eupolafghanistan.pdf)  
<sup>13</sup> Author's conversation with EU representative, 2008.

## The US again - FDD

In a belated recognition that the ANP was still failing to take off, the US took radical steps – it took over control, went back to the drawing board and threw a lot of money at the problem. The result was FDD – Focused District Development. A programme intended to cover the entire country, district by district, FDD is based upon extracting local police at the district level for two months of training (their areas to be covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police while absent) and then reinserting them into the home areas with mentors closely supervising them. Although the programme has been running since 2007, and is impressive in scale and ambition, it is as yet a little too early to judge its progress.

### “Quick fixes”: recruiting auxiliaries and militias...

For centuries in Afghanistan, in the absence of law and order, groups of local fighters have been gathered together, given money and weapons and asked to police their local area, more or less on their own terms, in the absence of anyone else willing or able to do the job themselves. With the demand for an ‘instant’ Afghan security force in 2002, it proved difficult to strike a balance between the need to quickly create forces and the risk that immature forces without proper training, accountability or esprit de corps will simply make the situation worse.

It has proved easy to hand out money, uniforms, equipment and weapons and straightforward to declare groups of armed personnel as a “police” unit, but much harder to make them perform with loyalty, impartiality and accountability to the Afghan government. Forces created hastily and thrown into service risk disintegration – in the hard-pressed south, there are regular stories of police units defecting, deserting their posts or otherwise fraternising in some way with the Taliban.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, efforts to create auxiliary police – the raising of local police units with a minimum of training – have raised controversy in the past (most notably in 2006) and, with a new administration in the US, may well do so in 2009. There are very strong suggestions that some form of re-arming of tribal militias is once again being contemplated. Regardless of whether such policies are effective or ‘culture appropriate’, such initiatives must surely frustrate strategy, cause resources to be diverted and work

<sup>14</sup> UPI, ‘Afghan police allegedly aided Taliban’, 4 Nov. 2008, [http://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/2008/11/04/Afghan\\_police\\_allegedly\\_aided\\_Taliban/UPI-32891225852233/](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/11/04/Afghan_police_allegedly_aided_Taliban/UPI-32891225852233/)

against the concept of coherent, centralised and accountable national police

### Hanif Atmar at the Ministry – quiet cause for optimism?

At the end of 2008, one of the few pieces of good news for the development of the police and the Interior Ministry as a whole was the appointment of Hanif Atmar as head. He has a reputation for efficiency, effectiveness and, crucially, appears to be free from corruption. He has done good work in his previous two ministries (Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Ministry for Education) and Atmar is unlikely to be tolerant of corruption and inefficiency. He will be certain to meet institutional resistance as beneficiaries of nepotism, poor quality officials and the corrupt now stand to lose position, money and influence. He will not be popular but progress is likely.

### Concerns for the future

There are several unresolved concerns that will ensure that progress with ANP development will be slow, fragile and potentially flawed:

- It is still not clear how much of a priority will be given to the police in comparison to the ANA. In the US, the debate is still ongoing – the highly credible and influential think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, insists that the ANP should *not* be the priority. If resources are diverted to tribal militias or some other form of local law and order concept, this may significantly slow the progress of the ANP.
- Corruption levels and a culture of nepotism at high levels in the Interior Ministry and amongst regional police commanders remain strong. Reform will be resisted by those who stand to lose.
- On the one hand, the US FDD programme is much needed, well-resourced, nationwide development initiative, on the other, it looks as if the ANP is now being trained as a counter insurgency force to support the army, rather than as a community police force.
- There is a risk that a political “numbers game” is going to be played with the manning levels of the ANP (and, for that matter, the ANA). Actors within the international community may be inclined to see high numbers of Afghan security personnel (as opposed to capability, sustainability, morale and retention) as a sign that the job has been done and their own presence is no longer needed.
- Regarding the future for other contributors – Germany, EUPOL, PRTs – despite the concerns over FDD, it might now be better to subordinate

to and coordinate with FDD as the only real show in town and at least have everyone travelling in the same direction?

## Conclusions

Although there are some relatively encouraging signs now, the starting point for the ANP was practically zero and it should perhaps not be a surprise that the state of the ANP remains woefully inadequate and is likely to remain so for the next half a decade at least. The interventions and assistance of the international community will remain crucial for the ANP's development (put bluntly, the ANP will not exist without the international community) but will continue to be fragmented and lacking in coherency. Whether the ongoing FDD process is the best way to develop the ANP has yet to be proven, but is already an academic issue – FDD is happening and there are no

viable alternatives of the necessary scale required, certainly not from existing initiatives such as EUPOL. While police manning levels will continue to rise and meet the intended target, this is only one fairly simplistic measure of performance and capability. Other more important aspects – morale, honesty, impartiality, leadership - will be in shorter supply. The trust of the people will not be regained easily and in large parts of the country, for the next few years they are still likely to be regarded as the problem rather than the solution.

*By Tim Foxley, SIPRI*

<sup>20</sup> See ISIS Briefing Note 1 : “Responsibility to Rebuild – Guinea-Bissau” [http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008\\_artrel\\_211\\_esr41-guinea-bissau.pdf](http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_211_esr41-guinea-bissau.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> United Nations General Assembly (2006), *Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict*, New York: UN, pp 7-11.

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## Brazil as an emerging security actor and its relations with the EU

*The EU and Brazil are making joint efforts to promote effective multilateralism, in particular in the field of peace and security recognising the United Nations as the core institution. In this article, Sarah-Lea John de Sousa discusses Brazil's current roles and aspirations in international peacekeeping and EU-Brazil synergies vis-à-vis security ideology, partnership and practice.*

### Introduction

In general terms, relations between the European Union and Brazil in the field of international peace and security are based upon common values and perceptions on security. In this sense, both are applying a broader security approach, taking into account not only the state but also the people and consequently all the elements which affect individual security in a broad sense like economic development, employment, education etc.

Brazil's relationship with the EU reflects its ambiguous situation: a country situated in between the developed and the developing world. International and multilateral security are part of the regular bilateral political dialogue in the context of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership launched in 2007. At the same time the EU provides some support for the domestic and transnational security problems Brazil and its citizens are facing, mainly through development-orientated programs aimed at promoting social cohesion.

This article analyses the specific characteristics of Brazil's emergence as an international and/or regional

peace and security actor, as well as the main aspects of its relations with the EU.

### Brazil in international peacekeeping

In 2004 Brazil for the first time assumed a leading role in international peace promotion accepting the military leadership of the United Nations Peace Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Since then the country is contributing to peacekeeping with an increasing number of personnel and financial resources. Additionally, Brazil's pro-active role in the international security structure is reflected by its efforts to promote a reform of the United Nations (UN) System, in particular the inclusion of more Southern countries, including itself, as permanent members of the UN Security Council.

But although Brazil is an increasingly engaged actor in international peace and security, its military resources remain rather limited, and its strength seems to lie in a soft security approach, especially regarding its regional neighbours. The Haitian case apart, Brazil hardly deploys any military personnel but promotes regional integration, sustainable development and democracy in order to support a stable and secure regional environment and to prevent conflicts. At the same time, Brazil is facing important domestic security challenges, such as high levels of urban violence, crime and also transnational organized crime.

### Brazil as a regional and international security actor

Since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 and the approval of the democratic constitution in 1988,

Brazil is one of the biggest democracies in the world and together with India the most important in the South and among developing countries. Despite significant domestic constraints, the South American country is emerging as an important and participative power in the international arena. It is a member of the G20 and several other multilateral fora, assuming a hybrid position between the North and the South. In the field of peace and security, Brazil shares key ideas and values with Europe, such as democratic governance, respect for human rights and the preference for multilateral dialogue channels and institutions. At the same time it retains a common historical and cultural heritage with many countries of the South.

Although Brazil participates actively in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and stresses its interest in playing a more influential role in the field of international peace and security, it still does not represent any more than approximately 1% of the world's total military expenditure, being situated 12th in the 2007 SIPRI military capacity ranking of states.<sup>1</sup> Within the region however, its position has much more weight, as it stands for around one third of the total military expenditure of Latin America.<sup>2</sup>

During the military dictatorship in the 1980s, Brazil's military expenditure and defence industry ranked among the first in the world, but after return to democracy and even more so since the beginning of the Lula administration,<sup>3</sup> military expenditure has decreased significantly. This is mainly due to President Lula's preference for social programs and his focus on sustainable socio-economic development. This situation has long marked an important difference with other emerging powers, in particular China, India and Russia, whose increasingly important role on the international scene is accompanied by higher military spending. In the case of Brazil, since the beginning of the present century the military expenditure represents around 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP), hence not showing any significant alterations during the last years.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, there seems to be a relatively new trend towards a gradual increase of Brazil's military capacity. In this context, the already approved reform

<sup>1</sup> SIPRI, *the 15 major spender countries in 2007*, [http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex\\_major\\_spenders.pdf](http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Worldbank, <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport>

<sup>3</sup> (2002, re-elected in 2006)

<sup>4</sup> SIPRI yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press, p.319.

of the National Defence Strategy<sup>5</sup> stresses that the military industry has to be supported and prioritised in order to facilitate the country's emergence as a player in the global security arena. In addition, a technology cooperation agreement has been recently signed with France to build a nuclear-powered submarine for Brazil and improve Brazil's military and defence technology.<sup>6</sup>

In terms of regional priorities in the field of peace and security, the Brazilian National Defense Strategy identifies Latin America and the Caribbean as top priorities. A stable neighbourhood is crucial for Brazil's own domestic security and development as well as its emergence as a global actor.

### Regional Level

South America in particular and Latin America and the Caribbean in general, are regions that show low levels of violent armed conflict compared to the African Continent and South Asia. Yet there remain several situations of instability and fragility, high levels of urban violence and crime, as well as transnational organised crime and in some cases weak democratic institutions.<sup>7</sup> Brazil is aware of the crucial need to promote peace and security as well as sustainable development in its neighbourhood, taking into account the link between security and development,<sup>8</sup> that is also emphasised in EU circles.

The only case where Brazil is actually involved in hard security issues in military terms, is MINUSTAH. But Brazil's involvement reflects its international rather than its regional agenda. A reinforced engagement in the framework of a UN peace mission is crucial vis-à-vis its aspiration to become a global security actor and a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Apart from the case of the Haiti, Brazil is more of a "soft security actor" in the region. This is especially so in South America, given that its focus lies on regional integration, development cooperation, support of democracy and democratic institutions in its neighbourhood, mediation and conflict prevention,

<sup>5</sup> Ministério da Defesa (2008), *Conselho de Defesa Nacional aprova por unanimidade proposta da Estratégia Nacional de Defesa*, Brasília,

[www.defesa.gov.br/imprensa/mostra\\_materia.php?ID\\_MATERIA=32662](http://www.defesa.gov.br/imprensa/mostra_materia.php?ID_MATERIA=32662)

<sup>6</sup> Mercopress, *Brasil confirma construcción de submarino nuclear con ayuda francesa*, 23 de Diciembre 2008, <http://www.mercopress.info/index.php/brasil/61-politica/417-brasil-confirma-construccion-de-submarino-nuclear-con-ayuda-francesa->

<sup>7</sup> Susanne Gratius (2007), "Brasil en las Américas: ¿Una potencia regional pacificadora?", *Working Paper*, FRIDE, pp. 17-23.

<sup>8</sup> Ministério de Defesa, "O Ambiente Regional e o Entorno Estratégico", *Estratégia de Defesa*, [www.defesa.gov.br/pdn/index.php?page=ambiente\\_regional](http://www.defesa.gov.br/pdn/index.php?page=ambiente_regional)

rather than military interventions. Apart from the *Mercado Común del Sur* regional trade agreement (Mercosur), Brazil supports the recently created Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which aims to promote regional integration and provides bilateral development cooperation to several smaller South American countries, for example Bolivia and Paraguay.<sup>9</sup> An interesting new initiative has been the launch of the South American Defence Council in the context of UNASUR, but for now the real impact of this very recent initiative remains unclear.

### International Level

On the international level, Brazil engages in peace and security activities mainly in the framework of the United Nations. Recently its contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations has increased to 1218 personnel, such that Brazil now ranks 15<sup>th</sup> among all contributing countries. But Brazil's financial support to the UN still remains relatively insignificant, not even ranking among the top twenty.<sup>10</sup>

Since the 1990s Brazil has participated in several UN Peacekeeping Operations, contributing almost 300 military personnel to ONUMOZ in Mozambique in 1992, more than 4000 military personnel and almost 50 police as well as some civilian staff in Angola in 1995 (UNAVEM III) and 1997 (MONUA).<sup>11</sup> In 2004, Brazil progressed to a greater role in peacekeeping, taking military leadership for the first time with the MINUSTAH mission, which has continued with two successive Brazilian Force Commanders.

Brazil's status position between the industrialized North and the developing South in international fora is an opportunity for benefits to both sides. On the other hand, the EU and other Northern powers place pressure on Brazil to decide if it wants to be seen as part of the global powers or as an outstanding developing country promoting the interests and the needs of the South. If Brazil seriously aims to be a member of the more powerful league, it has to assume the associated costs and responsibilities, including in the field of peace and security. In the meantime, Brazil has managed to transform its hybrid position into an added value in international fora and negotiations stressing its good relations with North and South and

therefore its negotiation and mediation capacity between both.<sup>12</sup>

At the same time, Brazil has important know how in "peacebuilding" due to its domestic experiences in combatting organized crime, narco-trafficking and urban violence at the national level. Nevertheless, although violence and crime levels have decreased during the last years, Brazil is still facing serious challenges.

### Domestic challenges

Public insecurity closely linked to a dysfunctional justice sector remain crucial challenges in Brazil. Transnational organised crime related to narco-trafficking dominates the slums in the margins of cities like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Recife. The police as well as the justice systems are considered to be part of the problem instead of providing sustainable solutions.

Since the 1980s, criminal rates have increased to an average of more than 1500 crimes per day and 27 homicides a year per 100,000 inhabitants. Brazil thus sits sixth in a global ranking of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)<sup>13</sup> and is among the most violent countries of the world.<sup>14</sup>

A significant number of homicides are committed by civil and military police, who participate in extermination groups and networks of corruption often related to organised crime. Corrupt members of the police and justice institutions are sustaining the dysfunctionality of the system, and impunity - in particular in the cases of police violence and torture in the land regions and in prisons - is still an important problem to be resolved.<sup>15</sup>

These high rates of violence and crime are perceived as strongly linked to the high levels of inequality and lack of socio-economic development in rural regions and the marginalized poor districts of the cities. With President Lula's administration, amelioration of the human development situation has been significant and in November 2008 Brazil figured for the first time amongst the list of countries showing high levels of

<sup>9</sup> Sarah-Lea John de Sousa (2008), "Brasil como nuevo actor del desarrollo internacional, la cooperación Sur-Sur y la iniciativa IBSA", *Comment*, FRIDE, Madrid, p.3.

<sup>10</sup> CIC (2008), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, Center for International Cooperation-New York University, New York.

<sup>11</sup> Clovis Brigagão (2008), "Contribuição Brasileira às Missões de Paz da ONU", *GAPConflitos III*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and GAPCon, Rio de Janeiro.

<sup>12</sup> Sarah-Lea John de Sousa (2008), "Entre o Norte e o Sul: o papel do Brasil no sistema internacional de segurança", *Nueva Sociedad Especial em Portugues*, pp. 123-132, <http://www.nuso.org/upload/portugues/2008/DeSousa.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *International Homicide Statistics*, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/IHS-rates-05012009.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Julio Jacobo Waiselfisz (2007), "Mapa da violência dos municípios brasileiros", *Organização dos Estados Ibero-Americanos para a Educação, a Ciência e a Cultura (OEI)*, Brasília, p.22.

<sup>15</sup> Amnesty International (2008), *Brazil-Amnesty International Report 2008*, [www.amnesty.org/en/region/brazil/report-2008](http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/brazil/report-2008)

human development.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, huge challenges remain in order to overcome corruption and impunity and better protect the population, in particular regarding the police and justice system and to overcome the high level of urban violence. In this context, the bilateral relations between Brazil and the European Union are focussing also on the domestic security challenges that the South American country is facing. The following section will stress that the Brazil-EU relations in the field of peace and security are approaching both the domestic situation and Brazil's position in the international system.

### **Brazil and the EU – political dialogue on peace and security**

The different international, regional and domestic aspects of Brazil's security situation are also reflected in its relations with the European Union (EC and Member States), and there seems to be considerable potential for enhanced cooperation.

In this sense, the following components are key elements of the bilateral EU-Brazil relations in the field of peace and security:

(1) The domestic public security challenges (in particular urban violence related to drug trafficking and transnationally organised crime), are addressed in the (EU) Country Strategy Paper by promoting social cohesion through development cooperation and bilateral dialogue on social issues with Brazil.<sup>17</sup>

(2) Regional and international security issues are addressed in the framework of the political dialogue<sup>18</sup> as part of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership launched in 2007.

Apart from the bilateral dialogue on social issues, Brazil is one of the EC's partner countries in Development Cooperation. In order to address the domestic public challenges and in particular urban violence linked to social exclusion and poverty in the marginalized poor urban "slums" the cooperation programmes between Brazil and the EU are focussing on improving the socio-economic situation of the urban population, as well as the access to education and political decision making.

<sup>16</sup> Human Development Report, Statistical Update 2008, [http://hdrstats.undp.org/2008/countries/country\\_fact\\_sheets/cty\\_fs\\_BRA.html](http://hdrstats.undp.org/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BRA.html)

<sup>17</sup> European Commission, *Brazil Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*,

[http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/brazil/csp/07\\_13\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/brazil/csp/07_13_en.pdf), p.19.

<sup>18</sup> *Joint Statement EU-Brazil Summit*, July 4 2007, Lisbon.

Brazilian defense policy defines security as a necessary condition for the country to safeguard its sovereignty and its territorial integrity, as well as its capacity to promote its national interests, exempt from pressures or threats and the guarantee to citizens to exercise their constitutional rights and obligations.<sup>19</sup> Although this definition is still very state centred, Brazil is gradually introducing a broader security concept in its foreign and defence policy, focusing in particular on the needs of individuals. This is underlined, for example, by development cooperation initiatives in Haiti aimed at promoting development as an important condition for sustainable peace and security.<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, the focus on national security and promotion of defence and military industry stressed in the National Defense Strategy<sup>21</sup>, shows that Brazil has no official approach towards human security. Although the link between socio-economic development and security promotion is stressed on the national level, in its international security approach Brazil has no clear strategy regarding this point. Its cooperation with the EU is, as shown above, still very limited and for the moment there is no mention of a Brazilian cooperation in ESDP missions as a third state. The reasons are that Brazil's international security focus is still more regional than global and the EU is not planning any ESDP mission in Latin America. On the other hand Brazil strongly prioritises the United Nations framework for peace missions instead of collaborating with regional organizations.<sup>22</sup>

The recent EU-Brazil summit held on December 22 of 2008 in Rio de Janeiro reflects that security is a minor issue in bilateral relations, as the summit's debates focused mainly on finance, economy and trade. Nevertheless, the EU stresses its support for Brazil's aspirations to become a permanent member of the UNSC.<sup>23</sup> Although security cooperation is not the priority of EU-Brazil relations, there is a common base for increasing relations in this field.

<sup>19</sup> Política de Defesa Nacional, Decreto Nº 5.484 – 01/07/2005) [https://www.defesa.gov.br/pdn/index.php?page=estado\\_seguranca\\_defesa](https://www.defesa.gov.br/pdn/index.php?page=estado_seguranca_defesa)

<sup>20</sup> Wladimir Valler Filho (2007), *O Brasil e a Crise Haitiana: A Cooperação técnica como instrumento de solidariedade de ação diplomática*, FUNAG, Brasília, pp.211-219.

<sup>22</sup> Mónica Hirst, *South American Intervention in Haiti*, FRIDE, Madrid, 2007, p.13 and Julia Schünemann, *Una aproximación socialconstructivista a la cooperación interregional y el interregionalismo: las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y el Mercosur*, PhD Thesis, Universidad Complutense, 2008, p. 267-268.

<sup>23</sup> Wilhelm Hofmeister, *Die Gipfelblase. Brasiliens Gipfeltreffen mit Lateinamerika und der Europäischen Union*, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Diciembre, 2008, p. 8.

Apart from stressing the security-development nexus and adhering to values such as democratic governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, the EU and Brazil are making joint efforts to promote effective multi-lateralism, in particular in the field of peace and security recognising the United Nations as the core institution<sup>24</sup>. Having said this, there is still some space to strengthen the relations between

Brazil and the EU in order to promote peace and security internationally and especially in Latin America as soft security actors.

*By Sarah-Lea John de Sousa, FRIDE*

<sup>24</sup> *Joint Statement EU-Brazil Summit, July 4 2007, Lisbon.*

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## **Parliamentary Updates January and February 2009**

The Parliamentary Updates for January and February 2009 are available on our website at:  
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With the support of The Marmot Charitable Trust, UK

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Bertelsmann Stiftung, International Security Information Service (ISIS) Europe and NATO Watch have the pleasure in inviting you to:

## **The Shadow NATO Summit**

### Options for NATO: Pressing the Re-Set Button on the Strategic Concept

**31 March – 1 April 2009  
Brussels**

**Hotel Leopold, 35 Rue du Luxembourg (Day 1) and  
European Parliament, Rue Wiertz (Day 2)**

#### Overview:

Senior NATO officials and civil society policy experts on comprehensive security will meet at the *Shadow NATO Summit* to identify, discuss and share ideas concerning the future of the Alliance. It will examine present trends in transatlantic security, nuclear weapon proliferation and the attitudes and assumptions underlying current NATO policy. It is anticipated that the Heads of State at the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary Strasbourg/Kehl Summit to be held a few days later will launch a review of NATO's Strategic Concept to be negotiated within the Alliance over 2009 and 2010. We are initiating a parallel civil society process to ensure the review includes NATO-wide public attention and engagement.

To kick-start such a consultation the *Shadow NATO Summit* will launch a 'Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security' (to complement the official version expected to be unveiled at the official summit) outlining the principles that need to be at the heart of the Alliance, and a new permanent NATO-wide civil society policy network: NATO Watch.

**There will be an evening reception at the Hotel Leopold at 19H on 31 March  
with keynote speaker:**

**Jamie Shea  
Director, Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General NATO**

The detailed programme is available at  
[www.isis-europe.org](http://www.isis-europe.org) and [www.natowatch.org](http://www.natowatch.org)

[Registration form next page](#)

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## The Shadow NATO Summit

### Options and Strategies for NATO:

### Pressing the Re-Set Button on the Strategic Concept

31 March – 1 April 2009

Brussels

Hotel Leopold, 35 Rue du Luxembourg (Day 1) and  
European Parliament, Rue Wiertz (Day 2)

#### REGISTRATION REQUIRED

**By 25 March 2009.** Late registration may not be possible.

Places are limited - To register, please complete the form below and send it to

ISIS Europe: [register@isis-europe.org](mailto:register@isis-europe.org) or fax: +32 2 230 6113

For information please contact:

Vibeke B. Thomsen [vibeke.thomsen@isis-europe.org](mailto:vibeke.thomsen@isis-europe.org) or +32 2 230 7446

**IMPORTANT:** For Day 2, please bring identification (ID card or passport) and arrive **by 8.30am at the reception of the ALTIERO SPINELLI building on Rue Wiertz** so that you can be given a pass and be escorted to the room.

Full Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Position: \_\_\_\_\_

Organisation: \_\_\_\_\_

Email: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_

I will attend the reception with Keynote Speaker Jamie Shea at 19H Hotel Leopold

For Day 2, if you DO NOT have a pass that allows you entry to the Parliament, for security purposes you MUST indicate in your registration request:

Date of Birth: (dd/mm/yyyy) \_\_\_\_\_

Address: Street \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ Postcode \_\_\_\_\_ Country \_\_\_\_\_

Nationality: \_\_\_\_\_

Passport / I.D. Number: \_\_\_\_\_

## ESDP and EU mission updates – March 2009

On 15 March 2009, EUFOR Tchad/RCA will conclude, reducing to 14 the number of operating ESDP and EU missions (giving it a total of six in the Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa). The number of completed missions is now 13 – making a total of 27 ESDP and EU missions to date. This article provides an update to our June 2008 overview of past, current and planned missions and an update to the chart and table of December 2008. Please see the June 2008 and the December 2007 updates for introduction to the missions. This update provides developments from June 2008 to present. The article also includes a graphical outline and listing of missions. ISIS updates these charts regularly as part of the **ESDP Mission Analysis Partnership** [www.esdpmap.org](http://www.esdpmap.org) and welcomes comments from users.

The full mission update article is available separately on our website <http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding>

*By Giji Gya, Executive Director and Johann Herz, Programme Associate*

**Completed missions:** There will be 13 completed ESDP and EU missions as at mid-March 2009 (see below and chart for further details Future updates available from [www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding](http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding)). The EU has also undertaken several election observer missions – not under ESDP.

**Table – Ongoing missions:** As at mid-March 2009, there will be 14 active ESDP and EU missions (six in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa) see below. Total of completed and ongoing missions now reaches 27.

Region	Military	Military coordination support	Civil-Military Police	Civil Rule of Law	Civil-Military SSR	Civil Border	Civilian Monitoring	Planning
Africa	- EU NAVFOR Somalia		- EUPOL RD Congo		- EUSEC RD Congo - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau			
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe	- EUFOR Althea BiH		- EUPM BiH			- EUSR BST Georgia - EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova	- EUMM Georgia	
			- EULEX Kosovo					
Asia			- EUPOL Afghanistan					
Middle East			- EUPOL COPPS Palestine	- EUJUST-LEX Iraq		- EU BAM Rafah		

## Chart of EU and ESDP missions to date, mid-March 2009

