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ISIS Europe news

The European Parliament undergoes elections next week and ISIS Europe will continue to follow new developments in our regular AFET and SEDE updates available here: <http://www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=epu#updates>. We welcome in this edition of the ESR two articles by ISIS Senior Advisors –; the first by Dr. Ian Davis highlighting the current opportunities globally and in NATO to address nuclear disarmament; the second by Dr. Stephanie Blair on the challenges the EU faces with converging civilian and military capacities in its ESDP endeavours. ISIS again updates our chart and table on ESDP and EU Missions and more detailed breakdown of missions will be forthcoming on www.esdpmap.org. We continue our series of ISIS Briefing Notes, with one summarising the discussions from the recent NATO Watch Shadow Summit conference in April and the second outlining the EU debate from an ISIS/DCAF book launch on Children's Security. ISIS is leading several projects over the next few months: the first in a series of roundtable trainings on Gender and Security Sector Reform with the DCAF toolkit; and a book launch with the Institute for Development and Peace (INEP) of a compilation of commentary on current affairs in the areas of peace and security. We also welcome SIPRI joining our office in Brussels and are delighted to announce a new SIPRI publication on EU law for dual-use goods. Another recent publication we would like to share is an anthology featuring speeches of former ISIS Board member Dr. Alyson Bailes. More details on these events and publications are in feature boxes throughout this ESR.

A Watershed Moment for NATO on Nuclear Arms

This article argues that NATO is a potential obstacle to progress in creating a nuclear-weapons-free world and calls for a progressive devaluing of nuclear weapons within the Alliance as part of a new Strategic Concept.

Getting to Zero: The story so far

It is extraordinary how ordinary the calls for eliminating nuclear weapons have become. In 2006 an illustrious Commission chaired by Hans Blix issued a comprehensive report listing sixty action items to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. In January 2007 and again a year later, four senior US public servants, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn called for

national leadership to eliminate nuclear weapons, and set out near-term steps to help advance this goal. Seven other former US Secretaries of State, seven former US National Security Advisors and five former US Secretaries of Defence now swell their ranks – as do leading figures in Great Britain, Germany, China, Russia, and elsewhere.¹

Indeed, those who believe abolition is unrealistic and dangerous are probably now in the minority, and the idea of “stable” deterrence – an alternative end-state to abolition – becomes harder to rationalise as proliferation of nuclear materials and know-how continues to occur. As this international support for the phased and verified elimination of nuclear weapons gathers pace, several key bilateral and regional security relationships hold the key to progress. In terms of building initial momentum,

¹ International ‘Getting to Zero’ initiatives include: the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (www.icnnd.org); International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe (www.luxembourgforum.org); Global Zero Initiative (www.globalzero.org); and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (www.icanw.org).

none is more important than the US-Russian relationship.

Most significantly, perhaps, US President Obama believes that the United States should pursue a global zero end-state. In a welcome change of outlook from the Bush administration,² Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared in her January Confirmation Statement that the United States would seek agreements with Russia to secure further reductions in weapons under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), work toward ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and search for ways to revive negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

President Obama met with his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in London on the sidelines of the G20 Summit on 1 April to discuss the first of those goals. The leaders said in a statement that the two countries would “begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START treaty”. The first round of those negotiations took place in Moscow on 18-20 May with the aim of achieving a new treaty to replace START before it expires on 5 December 2009. The next round of talks will be held in Geneva on 1-3 June. Additional reductions below the 2002 Moscow Treaty numbers, that is, below 1,700 operational warheads, may be possible with potentially deeper reductions after the conclusion of the latest US nuclear posture review in 2009-10.

But while most attention in Washington is focused on the bilateral US-Russian relationship, the broader US/NATO-Russian transatlantic relationship could have a powerful restraining influence on Obama’s ambitions for progress. Russia’s cautious but positive response to President Obama’s Prague speech³ on nuclear weapons gives grounds for optimism, but President Medvedev notes that US plans for a missile shield in Europe make it “impossible to compensate for a cut in nuclear arms by building up of conventional forces”⁴. Medvedev also pointedly repeated Moscow’s call for a new security pact to replace NATO.

² President Bush and then-President Vladimir Putin signed only one arms-control agreement in eight years. The 2002 Moscow Treaty (SORT) allowed both sides to keep between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads, but there was no timetable for implementation, few mechanisms for verification of compliance, no requirement for destruction of ‘retired’ weapons and it left many weapons on a high state of alert.

³ Remarks by President Obama, 5 April 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

⁴ <http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-39146620090420?sp=true>

Russian concerns about NATO superiority in conventional forces and the potential further eastwards expansion of NATO could well stymie progress on US-Russian nuclear disarmament talks beyond any simple extension of the START treaty. NATO military exercises in Georgia have already resulted in Moscow cancelling this month’s Russia-NATO meeting of general heads of staff.

Towards a new NATO Strategic Concept

The 60th Anniversary NATO Summit in Strasbourg largely passed without notice. NATO leaders adopted a rather tame Declaration on Alliance Security reaffirming the basic values, principles and purposes of the NATO Alliance. They also appointed Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the next Secretary General and launched the process to develop a new Strategic Concept, a document that will define NATO’s longer-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century.

But if Western leaders are serious about creating a nuclear weapon-free world, the process for developing a new Strategic Concept in NATO needs to be linked to the Obama Administration’s change agenda. And NATO’s new vision and mission must include Russia as a real and meaningful partner – one of the basic principles for reforming NATO to meet the different and diverse challenges of this 21st century, as set out in a *Citizens’ Declaration of Alliance Security*.⁵ Other core principles include achieving security without weapons of mass destruction and at lower levels of armaments, adopting a ‘responsibility to protect’ agenda as well as reconnecting with citizens by creating a more open, transparent and accountable Alliance. The new NATO Watch⁶ organisation is facilitating this citizens’ consultation and aims to increase transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness and participation in NATO policy-making.

Choosing the right reform path for NATO will also play a major role in shaping progress towards Global Zero. Instead of being a potential obstacle to progress, NATO could play a leading role in progressing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in part by making

⁵ Civil society groups meeting at a [Shadow NATO Summit](#) in Brussels at the end of March launched the Declaration, which is being used to start a NATO-wide, civil society-led public consultation on a new Strategic Concept. For more information, see www.natowatch.org

⁶ See article in ESR 44 The Shadow NATO Summit. Options for NATO: Pressing the Re-Set Button on the Strategic Concept http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_271_isis-briefing-note-2009-2-nato-shadow-summit.pdf

a nuclear weapon free world a headline goal in the new Strategic Concept.

Devaluing nuclear weapons in NATO

In practical terms, this would entail a progressive devaluing (preferably over a prescribed time period) of nuclear weapons within the Alliance. Up until now, of course, the opposite has been the case, with nuclear weapons playing a key role in NATO's military strategy since its inception in 1949. NATO's current Strategic Concept agreed in 1999 states that the "Fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war."

NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with US 'sub-strategic' or 'tactical' nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO, these sub-strategic weapons are seen as symbolic of alliance solidarity and a common commitment to war prevention. But such statements sound archaic at a time when Alliance solidarity is tested daily in combat with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some may also regard them as a hedge against future uncertainties, although NATO retains overwhelming conventional supremacy over any peer competitors.

Dr El Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, provided a withering attack on NATO's nuclear doctrine in a recent article in a German newspaper:

Imagine this: a country or group of countries serves notice that they plan to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in order to acquire nuclear weapons, citing a dangerous deterioration in the international security situation. "Don't worry," they tell a shocked world. "The fundamental purpose of our nuclear forces is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. Nuclear weapons provide the supreme guarantee of our security. They will play an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of our response to military aggression." Withdrawing from the NPT is a drastic step, but every state party to the Treaty has the right to do so, giving a mere three months' notice, if it decides that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized its supreme interests. The international uproar that would follow such a move is predictable. Yet the rationale I have just cited to justify nuclear weapons is taken from NATO's current Strategic Concept.⁷

⁷ Mohamed El Baradei, 'Five Steps Towards Abolishing Nuclear Weapons', *Sueddeutsche*, 4 February 2009
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de:80/politik/629/457290/text/>

A progressive devaluation of nuclear weapons within NATO should involve a number of steps to bring the Alliance's nuclear weapons policy into line with NPT commitments and international law. At a minimum, this requires a commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons and an end to European NATO states hosting US nuclear weapons under "nuclear sharing" arrangements. Ultimately, however, it would involve the Alliance adopting a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine.

Strengthening NATO's non-proliferation policy

In addition to devaluing the role of nuclear weapons, NATO could play a much more proactive role in counter and non-proliferation policy, with the overarching goal of preventing the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. The most urgent short-term goal of NATO non-proliferation policy should be to secure or eliminate non-strategic nuclear weapons and bomb-making materials in Russia--where there are materials sufficient to build tens of thousands of nuclear weapons--and worldwide, where smaller quantities of bombs and bomb-making material might be seized by a terrorist group.

To this end, the absence of any arms reduction treaties covering tactical nuclear warheads in the arsenals of both Russia and the United States is a bewildering dereliction of duty. These weapons pose increased security concerns because they tend to be portable and can be readily deployed outside of secure central storage. The United States and NATO should seek to negotiate a treaty with Russia on the verifiable elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons and on warhead accounting. Removal of US weapons from Europe would remove Moscow's main excuse for delaying negotiations on these weapons.

NATO's role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should also be reviewed to see whether a more focused and concerted response to maritime interdiction is possible. For example, how might NATO contribute to local, sub-regional and regional PSI operations in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman? And could NATO play a leading role in adapting the PSI to become one of the key policing mechanisms for the global elimination of nuclear weapons? A NATO-led PSI might be able to provide effective policing of the zero option, both in terms of the crucial drawdown to minimum deterrent postures within the nuclear weapon states and in preventing breakout in a nuclear weapon-free world.

Missile defences – a barrier to Zero

Ballistic missile defences are an expensive distraction from real security needs. The US system has so far

cost over \$120 billion dollars since the mid-1980s, with very little to show for it, and deployment of the European capability (radars in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland) is expected to add at least another \$5 billion. The NATO project to develop by 2010 a theatre missile defence for protecting deployed troops – the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Program – may have some utility, but should by no means be a priority in these cash-restricted times. When supplying sufficient helicopters and body armour to NATO troops on the ground in Afghanistan has been beyond some NATO Member States, it borders on the irresponsible to be squandering large sums of money on a 'Maginot line in the sky'.

The claim by some NATO officials that there is a growing threat from ballistic missiles also needs to be treated with caution. While there are growing numbers of shorter-range cruise missiles and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles in the world, many independent experts argue that the threat from long-range ballistic missiles has steadily declined over the past 20 years. Who is right? In order to judge the true magnitude of this threat and the best way to counter it, NATO ballistic missile threat assessments need to include consultation with non-NATO experts.

Second, NATO should focus on the need to prevent the development of missile defences from undermining strategic stability and impeding the reduction and elimination of nuclear forces. A way can and must be found to meet Russian concerns about the plans for a US missile defence system based in Central Europe; optimally, the deployment would be cancelled.

Third, the control of both missiles and missile defences needs to be put back on the international agenda. The basic premise of the ABM Treaty remains valid, and it is interesting to note that the recent [Declaration on Freedom from Nuclear Weapons](#) published by four German elder statesmen specifically calls for its restoration. Indeed, it is difficult to have a serious discussion on broader missile controls when the United States is developing a conventional 'prompt global strike' capability and is using missiles fired from pilotless drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), to assassinate 'militants' abroad.

Such vertical missile proliferation within the Alliance cannot be ignored nor can it be the foundation of new international missile control architecture. The point is this: if, in the words of US President Obama, we truly want to "send an unmistakable signal that our actions in defence of liberty will be as just as our cause" then the use of missiles for targeted assassinations should be outlawed. Given also the increasing military and security roles of UAVs, an international 'code of conduct' or agreement to regulate and limit their use is now overdue. Again, NATO could show leadership here by conducting a comprehensive, independent and impartial review of the use of UAVs within the Alliance.

Conclusions: Getting to Zero – rhetoric or reality?

In choosing between a world ruled by threat, or one ruled by law and mutual understanding, most of us would prefer the latter. But twenty years after the Berlin Wall was dismantled the fear of change is still with us. European public opinion tends to be either indifferent or opposed to a continued US nuclear role for Europe. It is also widely known that the United States is, in many circles, unconvinced about the need for a continued nuclear role in Europe. The review of NATO's Strategic Concept represents an opportunity for the Alliance to reconsider its dependency on nuclear sharing and come up with alternative, more valuable measures that demonstrate commitment.

A process of gradual withdrawal of remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe, an agreement with Russia to account for and verifiably eliminate tactical nuclear weapons and a phasing out NATO's remaining nuclear weapons missions would close one of the most dangerous chapters of European history. De-nuclearizing NATO would confirm the changed role of the Alliance in a new Century.

Dr Ian Davis, Founding Director, NATO Watch and Senior Adviser to ISIS Europe

For further details about the Shadow NATO Summit, Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security and NATO Watch, please contact Ian Davis: info@iandavisconsultancy.com

Towards Integration? Unifying Military and Civilian ESDP Operations

This article argues for an increased pace towards integrating military and civilian elements of ESDP operations. It examines the incremental steps taken by the Council Secretariat crisis management structures, particularly in relation to the sharp divide between civilian and military actions, towards integrated operations. Despite the obstacles none are insurmountable to eventual integration¹.

The enormous potential of the EU is set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS) which calls for the joining up of military and civilian aspects of crisis management. "We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations...we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities".² However, the EU has yet to deploy a truly 'integrated' operation³, yet the 2009 review of the ESS⁴ indicates that "our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced."⁵ Unfortunately the review of the ESS still distinctly sets apart the civilian from the military aspects of ESDP operations.

The Lisbon Treaty holds out promise for the restructuring of the institutional architecture behind ESDP and enhanced cooperation across all the EU assets for its future crisis management operations. Yet, in advance of the ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, there are already moves to improve the effectiveness of ESDP operations. The EU Council Secretariat will soon rationalize DG 8 (military) and DG 9 (civilian) into one new Directorate called the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). This logically follows on from the creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) over a year ago. These provide the first indications of

moves within the EU Council towards integrating its military and civilian functions and capabilities.

This trend had already occurred in the UN, through the new UN DPKO Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), and within various Member States⁶ which are working towards integration through implementing the comprehensive approach, also known as whole-of-government or 3D, (diplomacy, defence, and development). The aim is to bring together all the instruments at the disposal of the international community – military and civilian.

Challenges

Integrating the civilian and military elements of crisis management operations throws up enormous challenges while at the same time reiterates a well-known argument: the enhanced and concerted coordination among all actors involved in crisis management and peace operations is critical to achieving long-term peace and security. There is a widespread understanding of the need for a holistic approach in dealing with crises through integrated planning and operations. The worn out adage is that without security there is no development, and without development there is no security. One should add governance into the paradigm. The EU is particularly well-placed given that it possesses all the necessary tools for crisis management across the broad spectrum of its pillar structure and can deliver across the security, development and governance nexus.

Through experience, we have learned that the continued fragmented efforts of continued separation and isolation of military and civilian operations are counterproductive. Integration of all assets at the disposal of an organisation, and across organisations, with the aim of operating towards a single political-strategic aim, have become widely discussed topics in these days of searching for operational and cost effectiveness. Common to all approaches of integration, however, is the objective of enhancing the effectiveness of peace and security efforts through greater cooperation and coordination among all the actors involved. Beyond simply acknowledging the need for greater cooperation and coordination in peace and security, this article present the rationale for greater EU integration through an examination of the current obstacles and points out that the current trend towards coordination suggests that an integrated ESDP operation is possible in the foreseeable future.

¹ A subsequent article, to be published in ESR 45, will examine the increased cooperation and examine the mechanisms between the Council Secretariat and the Commission, seeking better interoperability and removing bottlenecks. This will be of particular interest if and when the Lisbon Treaty passes and enters into force.

² A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD. *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

³ See ESDP chart produced monthly by ISIS, www.isis-europe.org and the ESDP Mission Analysis Partnership www.esdpmap.org

⁴ *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, 11 December 2008,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf

⁵ A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD

⁶ In particular the UK has created the Stabilisation Unit which is a combination of the Foreign Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development.

In these days of financial crisis the search for cost-effectiveness surely provides another strong rationale for improving increased EU coherence and coordination. The question begs: is the EU making the most of its crisis management structures, tools and instruments? Some suggest that is it less, not more, than the sum of its parts. In the current era where the EU crisis management activities have significantly increased, the time has come to streamline structures and procedures.

Lessons from UN

While never popular in Brussels, there is some merit in setting out the UN's efforts at integration. In seeking greater 'coherence' in its approach to mission planning, the UN developed the concept of integrated missions with IMPP, which defines the steps towards ensuring integration at all levels of mission planning⁷ The objective of integrated missions is based, in part, on the recognition that more coherent approaches to conflict resolution are needed to manage the transition from war to peace. It is also based on the assumption that the integration of mission planning and management processes will enhance efficiency.⁸ While there is still confusion as to what an integrated mission should look like on the ground—as integration can take many forms and can occur at many levels—the concept continues to evolve and has been implemented in a number of missions including East Timor.

Still, it is important to realise that not all elements of a mission need to be integrated at all times and that “integration should be based, among other things, on a consideration of the various functions and roles that missions have to play in the context of complex multifunctional operations.”⁹ In other words, the need for an integrated mission should derive from the goals that are to be achieved and from the inherent benefits of integration in the specific case being considered. While more efforts must be taken to mainstream the principle into operations, each situation requires its own structure. An integrated approach should not be based on “inflexible blueprints,” but on an understanding of the security environment, the underlying causes of the conflict, and the actors present.

⁷ Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karin von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations* (New York, N.Y.: UN ECHA, May 2005), p 3.

⁸ Stuart Gordon, “The changing role of the military in assistance strategies,” in *Resettling the rules of engagement – Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations*, Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer, eds., 39-52, Humanitarian Policy Group Research Report 21 (March 2006): 50.

⁹ ISS Today, *Peacekeeping Reform: Democratisation, Devolution Or Multilateralism?*, 15 June 2007, www.issafrica.org.

Thus while UN, and various States have moved towards an integrated approach, the EU continues with its two rigid streams which make little sense. It has been engaged in a long-standing internal debate about the feasibility and desirability of integrated missions, and still has a long way to go before a consensus is reached. “Separated at birth, mainly to accommodate the demands of Member States that emphasized one or the other dimension of peace-building, all these bodies and norms have evolved into vertical silos that make horizontal cooperation and coordination more difficult to achieve.”¹⁰

EU advances

In a very short time, the EU has built a solid crisis management capability. It has conducted 22 operations around the world in the more than five years since the ESS was adopted. It is currently running a total of 12 operations (10 civilian operations /2 military operations)¹¹. The EU has attempted limited ‘integration’ with its current SSR mission in Guinea Bissau, where military and civilian personnel work together under one mandate, one mission head and one mission structure. Some suggest that the success of the mission is because of the small size and limited media spotlight. Experience from military and civilian operations corroborates the complexity of current threats – if these threats spill over into a specific crisis situation, they cannot be contained with purely military or civilian actions. The EU, based on its practical experience, is conscious of the need for greater coordination of its civilian and military instruments, both within the ESDP and among the individual EU pillars.

But EU engagements continue to have separate ESDP military and civilian chains of command, under overall authority of the Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political control and strategic direction of EU-led crisis management operations, which plays a central role in promoting enhanced coordination of ESDP actors in-theatre.

Unfortunately, the EU's potential for integrated missions is hindered by internal EU politics. However, the impending Lisbon Treaty will likely make coordination within the EU better and facilitate even more integrated solutions. Furthermore, the negotiations and horse-trading to create the EU External Action Service will throw up new structures and challenges.

¹⁰ Antonio Missiroli, *Commentary - Between EU and US: reassessing security and peace-building*, European Policy Centre, 29 October 2008. www.epc.eu

¹¹ For more information on current and completed ESDP operations see: <http://ue.eu.int/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN>

The EU Council Secretariat has suffered from rapid and fluid structural change, like its national counterparts. Over the last five years alone a number of new bodies have been established: a civilian/military cell in the EU Military Staff, an Operations Centre, and the previously mentioned CPCC. As the CPCC has developed and shown its ability to conduct operations, it has triggered the need to merge the strategic planning functions of DG 8 and DG 9 through the creation of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). The creation of the CMPD is a move in the right direction. However, one caveat is to highlight the potential for the domination of the strong military planning capabilities, which could crowd out the civilian character of operations. In the absence of civilian strategic planners, the new CMPD will need to ‘grow’ them and this will take time, although certainly not the 20 years as some with a military background would suggest.

Unfortunately, the EU continues to invest more time and money in developing its military crisis management capabilities at the expense of, and neglect of, developing its civilian capabilities,¹² despite the central role of civilian activities in crisis management and peacebuilding. Yet, even the ESDP rules and procedures for the financing of military operations have often proved, “if not counterproductive, at least hardly conducive to generating more resources or participants.”¹³

Conclusion

Promising indicators and trends point to integrated civilian-military operations in the foreseeable future – not like the one-off SSR mission of Guinea Bissau - but as a standard operating procedure and contributing to the crisis management architecture to harness the synergies of EU capacity under overall political strategy and guidance. Such an approach will bring unity of effort and maximize scarce resources. None of these challenges are insurmountable. As ever, the main obstacle is the political will and the level of ambition of EU Member States. If the PSC were to mandate an integrated civilian-military operation, the Council Secretariat would, and could, make it work. If the EU can’t do it with all the tools at its disposal, who can?

By Stephanie Blair, Senior Advisor on Crisis Management, ISIS Europe

¹² See “Tapping the Human Dimension”, ISIS Briefing Note No. 4, *European Security Review* no. 44, March 2009. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_esr_68_esr43-mar09.pdf


¹³ Peiter Feith, Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges Background Panel 3 The European Union’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Concepts and Challenges. 16.11.2007 <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/Whats-new/News/2007/Multidimensional-and-Integrated-Peace-Op.html?id=491112>



The Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small States Studies recently published “Through European Eyes”, in cooperation with the University of Iceland Press.

The book contains a selection of Alyson Bailes, Professor at the University of Iceland, recent speeches on global, European, and Nordic security issues together with selected writings by young scholars she has worked with – including two from Iceland.

For an online copy of the book, please click here: [Through European Eyes](#)



ISIS Briefing Note 2009: 2

The Shadow NATO Summit. Options for NATO: Pressing the Re-Set Button on the Strategic Concept

This briefing summarises the Shadow NATO Summit: Options for NATO - Pressing the Re-Set Button on the Strategic Concept, which took place on 31 March and 1 April 2009. The conference was co-organised by BASIC, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, ISIS Europe and NATO Watch, with the support of the Marmot Charitable Trust and an evening reception with Jamie Shea hosted by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

The Shadow NATO Summit took place in Brussels and brought together senior NATO officials, civil society and policy experts to identify, share and examine ideas on NATO's future, including a new Strategic Concept. The conference also explored ways in which civil society groups and parliamentarians within the Alliance could work together more effectively to advance NATO-related policies and actions, in line with keeping the shared democratic and humanitarian values of its members.

The conference was initiated by Ian Davis, Founder and Director of NATO Watch, on the simple premise that citizens of the 28 Member States of NATO should have a voice in shaping the future strategic direction of the Alliance. Both NATO Watch and a "Citizens' Declaration on Alliance Security" were launched during the Shadow Summit. Throughout the conference, participants were invited to comment and provide input to the Declaration, which was revised and finalized at the close of the Summit and will now form the basis of a NATO-wide public consultation on a new Strategic Concept. The primary objectives of NATO Watch are to provide independent monitoring, information and analysis of policy-making and operational activities within NATO. It further aims to increase transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness and participation in NATO policy-making via an active network of individual citizens across the Euro-Atlantic region.

NATO's relevance

Speakers from the first panel discussed NATO's role and relevance in the 21st century. Stefani Weiss (Bertelsmann Stiftung) gave an overview of NATO's political and military transformation to date and Mark Webber (Loughborough University) described a "narrative of crisis" within the Alliance which was permanent, negotiable, but unlikely to be terminal. Karel Koster (Netherlands Socialist Party), in discussing whether abolition or reform was the best way forward, highlighted a number of problems and hidden agendas before concluding that the present

NATO policies are self-defeating. Gareth Evans (International Crisis Group) asked whether NATO should be used for a wider range of global peace and security tasks, and in particular the role it might play in helping implement the international *responsibility to protect* agenda. He argued that NATO has still not worked out what kind of post-Cold War organisation it wants to be and raised three broad future options: a retreat into Cold War nostalgia with little change from the past; a slightly modified approach involving an inner ring of transatlantic members, an outer ring of partners and an outer ring of more distant partners and allies; and his preferred third option of NATO "fundamentally recast" as a global military resource - potentially available to prevent and resolve security problems worldwide in partnership with others, but only with appropriate UN authority. Mr Evans concluded that such a fundamental reshaping of NATO's role is not likely to be possible "any time soon".

Afghanistan

During the second session on Afghanistan, Tim Foxley (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI) analysed the problems encountered by NATO and emphasised the limited understanding, sharing of information and coherence of Alliance operations. He described NATO's unspoken aim as "extraction with credibility". Although critical of the Alliance, its naïve initial deployment to Afghanistan and dominance of the US at all levels, Mr Foxley posed the question, "If not NATO, who else?". Selmin Caliskan (medica mondiale) spoke about the critical situation of women in Afghanistan, including increases in maternal mortality rates, forced marriages and the militarisation of development. She also focused on the difficult civil-military relationship and on the importance of having an exit strategy from the conflict. John Sloboda (Oxford Research Group) emphasised the importance and the benefits of accurate casualty recording in Afghanistan and NATO operations more generally. He described why accurate and detailed casualty data is crucial for justice and reparation and called on NATO to play "a leading role in such an initiative, sooner rather than later".

Article V

The afternoon session focused on Article V and the implications of collective defence. Jean-Pierre Maulny (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques) argued that France's re-entry into the military command of NATO would have no impact on Article

V, since the country was already 95% in the Alliance. He also noted that there would be no change to France's position in terms of capabilities, NRF or in troop contributions to Afghanistan, but suggested that Paris might wield slightly more influence in military planning and transformation debates. Oliver Meier (Arms Control Association and Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy) argued that Article V had lost its relevance in the Post Cold-War world and noted that the only realistic scenario for invoking Article V would be the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists. He also outlined how US missile defence plans were undermining Alliance solidarity and argued that Russia now needs to be a partner of NATO, not an enemy. He concluded by stating that the concept of NATO nuclear sharing contradicts the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that public opinion favoured an end to the arrangement.

Liviu Muresan (The European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management, EURISC Foundation) gave an East European perspective to Article V and spoke about the rapidly changing nature of the global security environment. He suggested that further NATO enlargement would likely dilute the Article V drug, so that all that is left is homeopathy. And if so, will it still be effective? One solution that Mr Muresan suggested is to focus on bottom-up and regional security initiatives. Dmitri Polikanov (Centre for Policy Studies, PIR Centre, Russia) spoke about the importance of joint NATO-Russia activities but deplored the lack of significant examples of the genre. He also described how persistent negative stereotypes and myths among the public, both in Russia and in NATO Member States, were making NATO-Russia reconciliation more difficult. Mr Polikanov concluded by identifying seven priorities for NATO-Russia relations: (i) ratification of the CFE Treaty; (ii) an agreement on a joint missile defence system; (iii) mutual understanding in emergency situations; (iv) cooperation on funding for peacekeeping operations; (v) the common problem of Afghanistan and Russia's potential assistance; (vi) a joint approach to frozen conflict zones and (vii) PR partnerships to shift public opinion towards cooperation, notably in the Arctic zone, in relation to the Moon or regarding piracy.

At the end of the first day, Jamie Shea (Policy Planning, NATO) spoke at an evening reception sponsored by NATO. In a typically knockabout and entertaining fashion, Mr Shea outlined the strengths and weaknesses facing the Alliance in the run up to the 60 the Anniversary Summit.

NATO's capabilities

The second day of the conference took place in the European Parliament and was opened by MEP Helmut

Kuhne (PSE). During the first session on assessing NATO's capabilities, Andrew Michta (Georges C Marshall Center for Security Studies) drew attention to the disparity in financial commitment between European members of the Alliance (with only four spending 2% of GDP on defence) and the United States (that has been spending around 4% of GDP on defence since 2004). Daniel Keohane (EU Institute for Security Studies) spoke about NATO's limited role in counter-terrorism, while Martin Smith (Sandhurst Military Academy) discussed NATO's "political flagship" rapid reaction force. In shifting from deterrence to active defence, NATO has been on a "steep learning curve" according to Mr Smith, and one made even harder by the lack of a substantial joint threat analysis and threat assessment.

Peter Flory (Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investments, NATO) and Dave Webb (Praxis Centre, Leeds Metropolitan University) debated the NATO-izing of US ballistic missile defence in Europe. Flory rejected the idea of any serious citizens' opposition while Webb argued that the majority of the citizens in the Czech Republic, Poland and the UK, where US missile defence systems exist or are being proposed, are against the establishment of these bases.

Future Goals – moral-muscular-multilateralism, nuclear weapons and transparency

The last session of the conference was divided into three panels, each defining potential future goals for NATO. On the first panel "affirming collective defence and "moral, muscular multilateralism" as the primary purpose of NATO", Ian Davis (NATO Watch) spoke about measures to provide security guarantees to East European states without alienating Russia and argued for synthesising non-offensive collective defence and human security principles in re-shaping the Alliance's collective defence posture. He gave the creation of a joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Training Center in Poland as one practical example. Catriona Gourlay (United Nations Institute for Disarmament and Research, UNIDIR) focused on NATO's peacekeeping. After highlighting the Alliance's comparative military advantages and weaknesses, she concluded that NATO is currently not ideally suited to peacekeeping operations. If this is to become a core goal of the Alliance, Ms Gourlay argued that it would need to adapt its doctrines to clearly separate peacekeeping from war-fighting..

Guy Roberts (Office of the Secretary General for WMD, NATO) and Paul Ingram (BASIC) shared their views in the second panel on "eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and moving towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance as part of a global leadership strategy in moving towards a nuclear weapon free world". While

Roberts, arguing that the absence of war in Europe in the last 50 years proved that nuclear deterrence works, dismissed the need to move towards a nuclear free world, Ingram believed that removing US nuclear weapons from Europe was an essential step. He further stressed the importance of putting confidence building and disarmament on NATO's agenda.

Adám Földes (Access Info Europe) and Michael Stopford (Public Diplomacy Division, NATO) spoke during the third panel on "improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO especially with regard to defence planning and procurement". Földes spoke about the lack of transparency within NATO, arguing that the Alliance should move towards more openness and transparency, notably by allowing all NATO citizens greater access to its documents. Stopford responded that NATO had made efforts towards improving information dissemination of NATO activities but agreed that more could be done to improve transparency and open access within the Alliance.

Overall, the Shadow Summit was, as one subsequent blogger said a "perfectly-timed prelude to the real thing about to unfold in Strasbourg". And arguably the *Citizens' Declaration on Alliance Security* was richer in content than the official version unveiled a few days later. An annual Shadow Summit event is proposed – so watch this space – and a more detailed report on this inaugural event will be available shortly.

*By Vibeke Brask Thomsen, Programme Officer,
ISIS Europe
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ISIS Europe*

For more information on NATO Watch and its work, please visit www.natowatch.org or contact Dr. Ian Davis, Founder and Director of NATO Watch at info@iandavisconsultancy.com or Ms. Giji Gya, Executive Director of ISIS Europe at giji.gya@isis-europe.org



New SIPRI Research Report, Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods.

The report is written by Anna Wetter, a valued member of the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme between 2005 and 2007.

Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods introduces international and European export control arrangements covering dual-use goods, focusing particularly on the EC Dual-use Regulation. It also examines and critiques how the EU member states fulfill their European and international obligations in relation to dual-use export controls. Four in-depth case studies present the current dual-use export control law and enforcement systems in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, along with accounts of real-life investigations and prosecutions.

In her book, Anna has drawn extensively on her background in European and international law and her many interactions with European prosecutors, customs officials, investigators and academic experts, many with direct experience of enforcing EU export controls during her work with the SIPRI Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme. With these resources at her command, she is uniquely well placed to unpick the legal and operational complexities involved in export control enforcement and to present the subject matter clearly in a way that, I believe, will be of direct value to practitioners as well as making a concrete contribution to the academic and policy debates.

More information on Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods, including an executive summary for free download, is available at http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=365

ISIS Briefing Note 2009: 3
**Book Launch: David Nosworthy (Ed.), “Seen, but not Heard:
Placing Children and Youth on the Security Governance Agenda”**

This briefing note is linked to the ISIS Europe and DCAF book launch of “Seen, but not Heard: Placing Children and Youth on the Security Governance Agenda”. The briefing summarises the presentation of the book and the contributions of invited speakers. The panel included David Nosworthy, Fellow at DCAF; Malgorzata Gorska, DG Relex – Unit B1 Human Rights and Democratisation, European Commission; Sylvie Fouet, Programme Adviser at UNICEF; Shannon Meehan, Director of Policy and Advocacy at the International Rescue Committee and chaired by Stephanie Blair, Senior Advisor, Crisis Management, ISIS Europe

Why is action needed?

The restoration of justice and security is a priority of post-conflict peacebuilding, but children and youth – two groups especially impacted by armed conflict – are rarely considered in this process. This book provides a framework through which security provision can be made more relevant to the concerns of young people, and reflect their needs and aspirations. Engaging children and youth constructively in the peacebuilding process has far-reaching implications for successfully establishing long-term stability.

- 20 years after the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, there is still a need for real political will and engagement in order to fully realise its provisions.
- There is an increasing body of evidence that acknowledges the positive impact that the active participation of children can have on post-conflict peacebuilding.
- Much has been achieved in developing policy and legislation, but it is the practical application of such that is more than ever required.

The publication explores the role and responsibility of the security sector in the protection of children, stressing the close link between public security, human rights, and social development. A special focus is placed on the central role that civil society has to play. The principles put forward focus on three main levels: the role and responsibility of the security sector towards children; the role of civil society in security and child protection; and the role of children in peacebuilding.

Children and SSR

Although the security sector has a crucial role to play in the protection of children, this is not always recognized by policy makers and as such not adequately realised in practice. The security sector has a vital role to play in the protection of children, with statutory security bodies in particular, having specific responsibilities, not least in terms of protecting and promoting children’s rights. This responsibility extends to also ensuring that their own actions do not violate the rights of children.

The traditional, rather restrictive, concept that the security sector consists of only those bodies authorised to use force is being replaced by a broader definition that recognises a range of other institutions and bodies that are involved in management and oversight functions. The broader vision recognises the role of civil management and oversight bodies (internal affairs, Ministry of Defence etc.); judicial and public security bodies; non state security forces institutions (liberation armies, private security armies etc.); and non statutory civil society bodies (including media and NGOs). Within a framework of good security governance, the provision of the security requires multiple actors working together at multiple levels of interaction. A comprehensive view of the security sector is central to the functioning of a system that is capable of preventing grave rights violation from being perpetrated against children and youth.

International organisations, as well as playing a crucial factor in peacebuilding operations, increasingly recognise the importance of security sector reforms (SSR) in post-conflict and transitional situation. As a result, a range of instruments exist that provide a legitimate basis for security actors to place the protection of war-affected children on their agendas.

Civil Society

The principle of local ownership is central to security sector reform for ensuring its efficiency and longevity. Achieving local ownership entails recognising civil society not only as a provider of security but also for its oversight role in ensuring a stable and sustainable environment. As such, external actors should focus on empowering national and local actors to achieve this goal.

An informed and empowered civil society working with national and local authorities will not only be an important actor in terms of SSR but equally in ensuring that children’s right are realised. It will also

play an oversight role to monitor the situation of children and to ensure that state institutions live up to their responsibilities to ensure the effective protection of children.

The Role of Children in Peacebuilding

Due to the closer links that civil society organisations have to the local population, they tend to be able to provide more context specific responses to local concerns, including identifying meaningful ways of directly engaging with children and youth.

Civil society organisations can be useful in combating youth exclusion and providing opportunities for personal development (education, vocational training etc.). Easing the transition from childhood towards adulthood will help young people in establishing a positive role in society.

Too frequently, children are viewed as a static and vulnerable group rather than being recognised as developing individuals with constructive and valuable contribution to make to society. They represent a neglected part of the population and risk being exposed to peace-spoilers who are ready to abuse them and exploit them.

Addressing these challenges in peacebuilding terms needs multi-level approaches that involve all key stakeholders on a local, national and international level, with a specific focus on engaging young people as active agents in their own right, with a positive role to play in social development.

Recommendations

The publication concludes with policy recommendations aimed at assisting decision-makers in integrating the security concerns and aspirations of children into programmatic responses. Examples provided during the presentation included:

For civil society organisations:

- Work with national and local authorities to develop strategies aimed at tackling social exclusion and, in particular, support disadvantaged children and youth.
- Establish outreach mechanisms with communities, families and schools to provide avenues for children to express themselves on issues affecting them, including security.
- Establish mechanisms for dialogue with local law enforcement agencies on child protection concerns, including complaints mechanisms.

Regarding International Organisations, they have a vital role to play as catalysts for change - a

responsibility that involves building the capacity of local actors to address their own security needs. Approaches to consider in meeting this end include:

- Promote security sector reform initiatives, informed by good governance principles, as a vital step in the process towards sustainable peace, security and human development.
- Stress the importance of engaging civil society in consultative processes, to create local and national ownership of security matters, and in seeking ways to affect change.
- Adapt assistance programmes to promote youth as active participants in peacebuilding and in the democratic oversight of the security sector.

Child Protection at the EU Level

At the EU level, institutions have placed increasing importance upon the need to ensure that children's rights are present and recognised in relevant policy and programmes. The Treaty of Lisbon contains a number of references to the need to consider the best interests of the child in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The EU has shown broad and encouraging consensus on how to make progress, including a revision of the EU Guidelines on Children in 2008 and the 2009 EP Report on "A Special Place for Children in the EU External Action" (Rapporteur, Glenys Kinnock MEP). In addition, seven guidelines on children in conflict and post conflict situation have been established. Third countries engaged with the EU on issues of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and SSR must include the rights of the child in these processes. In addition the EU has developed a checklist for enabling the integration of a children's dimension into ESDP missions. This checklist stresses respect for children's rights on a sustainable and long term basis.

Challenges include

- Identifying the appropriate means by which to integrate the child dimension into programmatic response.
- The task force on children is too "Presidency dependent" and requires a more systematic and permanent Brussels based approach involving the various EU institutions.
- Despite the presence of a good policy framework, implementation is lacking and needs to move beyond awareness towards action.

Recommendations

- It is necessary to move the task force from the Presidency of the Council towards the European Commission to ensure a more

sustained and consistent approach to children independent of the Presidencies' priorities.

- Training of military staff at the level of operation command by child protection experts.
- NGO's need to play a role of protector and detector, and develop adequate responses to potential abuse of children's right.

In Conclusion

A crucial interaction to stress, in the relation between children and the security sector, is the need for a broad, rights-based approach to security governance that responds to the security needs and aspirations of children and youth in both policy and practice.

Security governance principles need to guide security sector reform activities. This will enable the creation of a secure and protective environment, necessary for ensuring the healthy development of children, thereby allowing all young people to realise the fullness of their capacities.

Overall, the influence that civil society organisations can bring to the peacebuilding process is crucial. In particular, their active role at the community level offers an invaluable vehicle for introducing children's security to a broader governance agenda.

Briefing note by Johann Herz, ISIS Europe and David Nosworthy

Parliamentary Updates March and April 2009

The Parliamentary Updates for March and April 2009 are available on our website at:

www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=eupdates

If you are interested in receiving the updates every month directly to your mailbox you can subscribe to the Parliamentary briefs from our website www.isis-europe.org or by following this link:

www.graphicmail.com/rwcode/subscribe.asp?siteid=2177&mode=subscribe



The Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) is the lead editor of the 2009 edition of the Friedensgutachten / FGA, an annual, German-language publication that comments on current affairs in the areas of peace and security from an academic point of view.

The joint INEF and ISIS Europe book launch for the

“Peace Report 2009 – Ending Wars”

(including presentations by FGA authors) will take place

In Brussels on 20 July 2009 (*exact date and location tbc*)

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Gender and Civil Society Oversight of Security Sector Reform Roundtable training with the Gender and SSR Toolkit



DCAF and ISIS Europe will be conducting three roundtables in 2009 to train on implementation and use of the Gender and SSR Toolkit (www.dcaf.ch/gssrtoolkit).

More information on the toolkit, which was launched in Brussels in May 2008, can be found at <http://www.dcaf.ch/gssrtoolkit>

The toolkit has been distributed to staff in the Commission and Council, as well as to ESDP missions and some government representatives. These trainings constitute the follow-up to this toolkit to explore and workshop the practical considerations of gender and SSR with a specifically designed training kit. Please find attached an initial short brief with further description about the roundtable/workshops. Trainers for the workshops will include authors of the tools as well as experienced practitioners in the field of SSR (including current and previous ESDP personnel) and NGOs.

Roundtable/workshop 1: 24-25th June 2009


- Police Reform and Gender
- Defence Reform and Gender
- Private Military and Security Companies and Gender

Roundtable/workshop 2: 21-22nd September 2009

- Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender
- National Security Policy-Making and Gender
- Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender

Roundtable/workshop 3: 5-6th November 2009 (tbc)

- Justice Reform and Gender
- Penal Reform and Gender
- Border Management and Gender



Please note that participation in the roundtable trainings is by invitation only

For more information, contact: Ms. Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe giji.gya@isis-europe.org or coordinator for this project: Vibeke Thomsen, Programme Officer, ISIS Europe vibeke.thomsen@isis-europe.org Ph +32 2 230 7446 or Ms. Karin Grimm, DCAF, k.grimm@dcaf.ch Ph +41 22 741 77 44



The Roundtables on Gender and SSR are supported by the European Commission under the Peacebuilding Partnership.

Current Operation Evolution

*There are currently 14 operating ESDP and EU missions (giving a total of six in the Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa). The number of completed missions is now 13 – making a total of 27 ESDP and EU missions to date. This article provides an update to our March 2009 overview of past, current and planned missions. Please see the June 2008 – March 2009 updates for introductions to the missions. The article also includes a graphical outline and listing of missions in the chart and table. ISIS updates these charts regularly as part of the **ESDP Mission Analysis Partnership** www.esdpmap.org and welcomes comments from users.*

Military:

EUFOR Althea - 2 December 2004 to 21 November 2009

A potential reconfiguration of the European presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is increasingly feasible. This will also possibly be linked with a reconfiguration of the Office of the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina. John McColl, Operational Commander of operation Altheas stated there are no more feasible situations in which Althea would be called to act. Although the political situation is not the most stable, the security situation is very stable. The Commander's view further indicates a potential downsizing of the mission in the coming months.

EU NAVFOR Atalanta – 8 December 2008 to 2 December 2009

The EU maritime mission fulfils its core purpose which is the escorting of the ships of the World Food Programme to the shores of Somalia. Communication and co-operation with third countries is good and there is a clear understanding of the objectives of the anti-piracy mission. The legal aspect concerning the capture and the trial of pirates has now evolved with the signature on 6 March of a treaty between the EU and Kenya, allowing Kenyan authorities to undertake proceedings against captured pirates. European ships can now hold pirates captive until given to the Kenyan Government to be trialled. The mission has seen its capabilities increased with 3 Swedish war ships to reinforce the 10 already present.

Civilian/Military:

EUSSR Guinea Bissau – 12 February 2008 to 31 May 2009

The assassination of the President of Guinea Bissau created uncertainty in the country. The recent turnover of people coming and going in the government due to the recent elections has diminished the aptitude of the mission to establish strong communication links with the government. The Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior has shown good will to endorse the mission's mandate of advice on security sector reform. A possible prolongation of six months of the mission is still in discussion in the Council.

EUPOL Afghanistan – 30 May 2007 to 30 May 2010

The work of the mission was in the past months marked by the gap between what was promised by the Member States in terms of capabilities and what has been provided. Personnel shortage is increasingly being filled. The mission has now 230 staff on the ground with 80 others about to arrive. By the end of June the number of personnel will be between 300 and 350. The shortage of personnel has been at the heart of the mission's criticism, the sole responsibility lies within Member States' failure to respect agreements over capabilities. Although there are still significant incoherencies and incompatibility of strategy between players involved in Afghanistan, there has been improvement these last months on delineation of each international and national bodies' role involved. The mandate of EUPOL seems to be better understood by the different actors on the ground. In addition, the International Police Coordination Board has been restructured and has clarified the situation on a "who does what" basis. Finally, progress has been made in terms of coordination with the Afghani government.

Civilian:

EULEX Kosovo – 15 June 2008 to 15 June 2010

The EU mission in Kosovo achieved full operational capability on 6 April 09 which has been welcomed by the Kosovar authorities. EULEX has been actively outreaching to the Kosovars to enable them to understand the mission's role and its mandate, this is especially the case in north Kosovo where all communities are addressed. A key factor for success is to make the population know that EULEX is not another UNMIK. The mission needs to prove that it can successfully implement its mandate. Thus far EULEX has delivered its first verdict in a War Crime Trial and re-opened the court house in North

Metrovica. This decision has been received well by parts of the population and not as well by others, with Kosovo still remaining a beacon of criminal activity. The EU mission has been monitoring crossing points on navigable roads, in doing so, petrol smuggling coming in Kosovo has diminished. The main challenge of EULEX's work will be to gain the trust of civil society and the Kosovar Government, this will in turn depend on the quality of the work achieved.

EUJUST LEX Iraq – 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2009

The first training on Iraqi soil occurred on 11 May 09 and a plan to increase in-country activity in the coming year is being examined by the Council. However it seems logistically that training will also continue to occur in the EU. Although this mission has been portrayed as a success story, there is no hard evidence that training given to the Iraqi police and justice sector personnel is trickling down within institutions in Iraq.

EU MM Georgia – 15 September 2008 to 15 September 2009

Since the beginning of the operation, members of the EU mission have not been able to access the break-away regions. The Geneva talks have not altered the status quo and chances of access remain very low. The OSCE and the UN mission in Georgia are reaching the

end of their mandate and it is probable that they will not be extended or might be downsized instead. The EU mission is however very likely to be extended, and at present the mission now includes staff with regional expertise.

Completed Missions:

EUFOR Tchad/RCA - 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009

Although the mission was completed on 15 March, the recent outbreak of violence at the beginning of May on Chadian soil resonates with the lessons learned by the EU military mission. It was foreseen that the transition between EUFOR and the UN mission MINURCAT II could have been a potential window for the re-ignition of violence, however Chadian troops were able to defeat rebel troops quickly. There are still many EU troops on the ground that made the transition from an EU command to a UN one. EU troops in the UN mission are likely to be withdrawn with the arrival of the rainy season in June and some government representatives are hopeful that Chadian troops coupled with the UN mission should be able ensure security by then.

*By Johann Herz, Programme Associate and Giji Gya,
Executive Director*

ESDP and EU mission updates – May 2009

Table 1 – Completed missions: There will be 13 completed ESDP and EU missions as at mid-May 2009 (see below and chart for further details Future updates available from www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding). The EU has also undertaken several election observer missions – not under ESDP.

Region	Military	Civil-Military assistance / Military coord. support	Civil Police	Civil Rule of Law	Civil-Military SSR	Civil Border	Civilian Monitoring	Planning
Africa	- Artemis DRC - EUFOR RD Congo -EUFOR Tchad/RCA	- Support to AU - AMIS Sudan - EUNAVCO Somalia	- EUPOL Kinshasa					
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe	- CONCORDIA fYROM		- EUPOL Proxima (fYROM) - EUPAT (fYROM)	- EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)			- EUMM Western Balkans	- EUPT Kosovo
Asia							- AMM Monitoring Mission	
Middle East								

Table 2 – Ongoing missions: As at mid-May 2009, there will be 14 active ESDP and EU missions (six in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa) see below. Total of completed and ongoing missions now reaches 27.

Region	Military	Military coordination support	Civil Police	Civil Rule of Law	Civil-Military SSR	Civil Border	Civilian Monitoring	Planning
Africa	- EU NAVFOR Somalia		- EUPOL RD Congo		- EUSEC RD Congo - EU SSR Guinea-Bissau			
Balkans/ Caucasus/ East Europe	- EUFOR Althea BiH		- EUPM BiH - EULEX Kosovo			- EUSR BST Georgia - EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova	- EUMM Georgia	
Asia			- EUPOL Afghanistan					
Middle East			- EUPOL COPPS Palestine	- EUJUST-LEX Iraq		- EU BAM Rafah		

Chart of EU and ESDP missions to date, mid-May 2009

